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Understanding Section 152 CPC through Muhammad Hussain vs. Ali Muhammad (PLD 2025 Lahore 682)
Section 152 CPC Explained – Can a Court Change Its Judgment? | PLD 2025 Lahore 682 Case Analysis
Learn how Section 152 CPC limits a court’s power to correct only accidental mistakes in judgments. A detailed case study of Muhammad Hussain vs. Ali Muhammad (PLD 2025 Lahore 682), with insights and FAQs on decree amendment in Pakistan.
Introduction: The Power — and Limits — of Judicial Correction
Imagine this: you fight a land case for years, finally win, and then realize the court forgot to mention one key word — possession. You go back to the judge, expecting a quick correction. But the court refuses, saying it can’t “rewrite” its own decision.
That’s exactly what happened in Muhammad Hussain vs. Ali Muhammad (PLD 2025 Lahore 682) — a case that clarifies when courts can correct their own mistakes, and when they cannot.
Let’s break down what really happened, what Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) allows, and why it matters to anyone involved in property or civil litigation.
Background of the Case
Muhammad Hussain filed a civil suit in Sheikhupura for ownership and possession of land. The trial court dismissed his case. On appeal, the appellate court modified the decision and granted him ownership over part of the land — but the decree didn’t mention “possession.”
Years later, Hussain filed an application under Section 152 CPC, claiming the omission of the word “possession” was a clerical or accidental error that needed to be corrected.
He argued that since he had won the case, the decree should naturally include the right to possession as well.
The Legal Question
The central issue was simple but crucial:
> Could the court add the word “possession” to the decree under Section 152 CPC, or would that amount to changing the substance of the judgment?
What Section 152 CPC Says
Section 152 CPC empowers a court to correct clerical or arithmetical mistakes or errors arising from accidental slips or omissions in judgments, decrees, or orders.
In other words, if the mistake is purely technical — a typo, a number error, or an unintended omission — the court can fix it.
But if the change alters the meaning, intention, or substance of the judgment, it’s not allowed.
The logic is straightforward: a judgment speaks from the date it’s announced, not from what a party later wishes it had said.
Court’s Reasoning
The Lahore High Court took a firm view. It held that:
The appellate court had intentionally granted ownership but not possession.
The omission was not a “clerical mistake”; it reflected the conscious intention of the judge at the time of decision.
Section 152 cannot be used to reopen, revise, or alter a concluded judgment.
Justice emphasized that if the party wanted possession, they should have claimed and argued it specifically during the case.
Once the court had decided the matter on those pleadings, the decree could not be changed later to include something that wasn’t originally granted.
The Ruling
The High Court dismissed the petition.
It clarified that Section 152 CPC does not permit a court to change its decision or add new relief under the cover of “correction.”
The judgment reinforced a key legal principle:
> “A court may correct a slip — but it cannot rewrite its own judgment.”
Why This Case Matters
This ruling isn’t just a technicality. It’s a reminder of how precision in pleadings and arguments shapes justice in Pakistan’s courts.
When you file a case — especially for property or ownership — every word in your claim matters.
If your pleadings don’t include possession, injunction, or damages, the court won’t grant them later by “correction.”
Section 152 is there to fix typing mistakes, not rethink outcomes.
Practical Lessons for Litigants and Lawyers
1. Be precise in your plaint.
Clearly mention every form of relief you want — ownership, possession, mesne profits, injunction, etc.
2. Review judgments carefully before they become final.
If a clerical mistake exists, file for correction quickly. Delay weakens your claim that it was “accidental.”
3. Understand the limits of Section 152 CPC.
It’s not a backdoor appeal. If you disagree with the judgment, file an appeal or revision — don’t expect the same court to change it.
4. Use Section 152 only for genuine slips.
Like an incorrect plot number, a misspelled party name, or a mathematical error. Anything more substantive won’t qualify.
5. Don’t confuse decree correction with review or appeal.
Section 152: for clerical/technical errors.
Section 114 (Review): for re-hearing on limited grounds.
Appeal: for challenging the merits of the decision.
Key Takeaways
Section 152 CPC is a narrow tool — it corrects slips, not substance.
Courts distinguish between clerical and intentional omissions.
If the decree reflects what the court intended, even if it seems unfair, it cannot be changed under Section 152.
Always draft and argue your case fully at the outset — post-judgment corrections rarely help.
FAQs
Q1: Can a court change its judgment after announcing it?
No. A court can only correct accidental or clerical mistakes, not alter or add to its decision once it’s announced.
Q2: What kind of mistakes can be corrected under Section 152 CPC?
Typographical errors, wrong date or figure, misspelled names, or accidental omissions that don’t affect the substance of the judgment.
Q3: What if the court forgot to grant a relief I requested?
You can file an appeal or review — not a Section 152 application. The correction power doesn’t cover substantive reliefs.
Q4: Can the court change a decree years after judgment?
Only if it’s a genuine clerical mistake and doesn’t reopen the merits. Otherwise, the judgment stands final.
Q5: What’s the difference between decree amendment and appeal?
A decree amendment under Section 152 fixes slips; an appeal challenges the correctness of the decision.
Final Thoughts
The Muhammad Hussain vs. Ali Muhammad case reminds us that the justice system values finality and precision.
Lawyers and litigants alike must understand that the time to win or lose a case is during pleadings — not after judgment.
A missing word can change your entire legal outcome.
And once a court has spoken, Section 152 won’t let you rewrite history.
Sometimes the biggest injustices don’t happen in the marketplace or the courtroom; they happen inside homes, quietly, between people bound by blood. That’s exactly what makes 2025 CLC 1784 such an important judgment. It’s a reminder that the law isn’t blind to power imbalances, especially when property is taken from someone who doesn’t even realize what they’re losing.
This case doesn’t just deal with a mutation, it deals with trust, manipulation, vulnerability, and how easily an elderly woman can be stripped of her rights by the very people she depends on. And the Lahore High Court stepped in to draw a clear line.
Let’s break this case down and understand what it teaches us about fraudulent mutations, burden of proof, protection of pardanasheen women, and the wider impact on property and eviction disputes in Pakistan.
1. Background of the Case – What Actually Happened?
The respondent, Irshaad Bibi, was an octogenarian, illiterate, widowed woman. She had no son, no male heir, no one to rely on except her maternal grandson, Muhammad Umar Farooq, the same person who eventually claimed ownership of her property.
According to her:
She never sold her plot.
She never agreed to transfer it.
She never received the alleged Rs. 350,000 consideration.
And she never knew a “sale mutation” had been entered in the records.
This is something courts see too often: an elderly woman, dependent on family members, ends up losing her land through a signature, a thumb impression, or a quiet manipulation she never fully understands.
The grandson, on the other hand, argued:
She did sell the property.
The price was paid.
The mutation was lawful.
The trial court didn’t buy it. Neither did the appellate court. And finally, the Lahore High Court upheld the dismissal.
2. What Made This Case Different?
Here’s the thing: this wasn’t just a dispute about whether money was paid or not.
There were alarming facts:
The woman was in her 80s
She was uneducated
She lived alone
She depended entirely on the petitioner
He lived with her
He had emotional and practical control over her life
There was no independent advice
There was no witness to any negotiation
The petitioner was only 20 years old with no job or income, making his “ability to pay” highly questionable
These facts flipped the burden of proof completely.
In ordinary cases, the person alleging fraud must prove it.
But in cases involving:
Pardanasheen women
Illiterate women
Elderly and dependent women
…courts have always taken an entirely different approach. The beneficiary in this case, the grandson must prove the transaction was fair, genuine, and free of influence.
He failed miserably.
3. The Court’s Key Observations (Clear & Direct)
Justice Rasaal Hasan Syed laid down the principles with sharp clarity:
a) When a woman is old, illiterate, pardanasheen, or dependent, the law becomes protective.
The court emphasized that such women can easily be manipulated even by family.
b) The burden of proof is on the beneficiary not the woman.
The grandson had to prove:
The sale took place
Money was paid
She understood the deal
She had independent legal advice
There were witnesses
There was negotiation
There was a valid reason to sell
He proved none of these.
c) The petitioner had no money making his claim hollow.
At the time of the alleged sale in 2018, he was:
20 years old
Unemployed
Without any source of income
So how did he magically buy a property?
He couldn’t explain it. And the court didn’t accept it.
d) No negotiation, no price discussion, no independent proof.
There was not a single credible witness who could say:
When the sale happened
How the price was agreed
How the money was paid
Who witnessed the exchange
This made the “sale” unbelievable.
e) Fraud does not require revenue officers to be impleaded in every case.
A key argument by the petitioner was that the respondent didn’t make revenue officials parties, so the case should fail.
The Court rejected this entirely.
Impleading revenue staff is not mandatory in every fraudulent mutation case especially when:
The lady is vulnerable
The beneficiary cannot prove the sale
The evidence of fraud is already strong
This is a crucial point because it protects victims from unnecessary technical loopholes.
4. Why This Case Matters for Owner and Property Law
Even though this case is about fraud and mutation cancellation, it connects directly to property laws and broader property rights in Pakistan.
This judgment reinforces:
Fraudulent documents carry NO legal value
Beneficiary must prove authenticity
Vulnerability of parties is a deciding factor
2. Property transfers involving elderly women are heavily scrutinized.
If a buyer claims ownership through a suspicious mutation involving an elderly woman owner, this case empowers the court to:
Look deeper
Shift burden of proof
Protect the true owner
3. Genuine owners gain stronger legal footing.
Anyone falsely claiming ownership through a manipulated mutation especially involving seniors faces strict judicial scrutiny.
This strengthens forged sale claims filed by lawful owners.
5. Authoritative Rulings Relied Upon
The judgment is rooted in multiple Supreme Court precedents:
2016 SCMR 862 (Ghulam Farid case) – Strict conditions for transactions with pardanasheen women
PLD 2023 SC 628 Burden lies on the beneficiary to prove fairness
2021 SCMR 19 Impleading revenue officers not mandatory
PLD 2022 SC 99 Courts must protect vulnerable women from exploitation
These cases create a legal shield around women who otherwise have no defence.
6. Practical Legal Insights for land owners, buyers & Families
Here’s what this judgment teaches:
1. If the seller is elderly or illiterate, the buyer must prove everything.
You must produce:
Independent witnesses
Negotiation history
Payment proof
Financial ability
Independent legal advice
2. Oral sales involving vulnerable women are rarely accepted.
Courts treat them with extreme caution.
3. Emotional dependency can be considered “undue influence.”
If a beneficiary lives with the woman and controls her life, the court assumes pressure.
4. Mutations based on fraud can be canceled—even years later.
There is no limitation when fraud surfaces.
5. In land disputes, forged claims of ownership will not help buyers.
Courts favour legal owners—not opportunistic occupants.
7. FAQs (Reader-Friendly)
Q1: Can a mutation be canceled if an elderly woman was unaware of the sale?
Yes. If she is illiterate, dependent, or vulnerable, the buyer must prove fairness. Failure automatically leads to cancellation.
Q2: Does alleging fraud require revenue officers to be made parties?
Not always. It depends on the facts. If the beneficiary cannot defend the transaction, the case stands without impleading officers.
Q3: Is oral sale valid in Pakistan?
Technically yes but courts rarely accept it unless backed by strong, independent, credible evidence.
Q4: What if the buyer was too young or unemployed to pay consideration?
Lack of financial capacity is a red flag and usually proves fraud.
Q5: Are pardanasheen and illiterate women treated the same under property law?
Yes. Courts extend equal protection because both groups are vulnerable to manipulation.
8. Conclusion
2025 CLC 1784 is a reminder that the law sees beyond signatures and paper. It sees power dynamics. It sees vulnerability. It sees the quiet ways in which people can be exploited sometimes by the very hands meant to protect them.
For property owners,buyers, lawyers, and families, this case lays down a clear message:
If you want the court to believe a property transfer involving an elderly or illiterate woman, you must prove it with clean, convincing, and independent evidence. Nothing less will stand.
And for victims of fraudulent mutations?
This judgment is reassurance that the law is firmly on their side.
Here’s the thing: property disputes in Karachi often feel like a tug of war—owners want to redevelop and the government wants to protect heritage. But what happens when a building is both a “dangerous building” and a “protected heritage”?
That exact collision happened in Faisal Amjad v. Province of Sindh (2025 CLC 1664), and the Sindh High Court delivered a judgment that now sits at the heart of heritage and demolition laws in Pakistan, demolition disputes, and heritage conservation.
If you own property in Karachi—or you’re a tenant facing eviction, or a developer trying to comply with SBCA rules—this case quietly reshaped the legal landscape beneath your feet.
Let’s break it down without the jargon.
1. The Story Behind the Case: When Two Laws Fight Over One Building
The plaintiff, owner of Maryam Mansion in Ghulam Hussain Kassim Quarters, Karachi, ended up caught between two government authorities:
1. SBCA (Sindh Building Control Authority)
SBCA had already declared the building “Dangerous Building Category-I” under Section 14 of the Sindh Building Control Ordinance (SBCO), 1979.
Meaning?
Structure unstable
Immediate risk of collapse
Mandatory demolition
Occupants must vacate
2. Sindh Cultural Heritage Department
Out of nowhere, a Notification dated 3 June 2021 declared the same building a “Protected Heritage” under Section 6 of the Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994.
So SBCA said:
“Demolish it before someone dies.”
Heritage Department said:
“Touch it and we will penalize you.”
Caught in the crossfire, the owner moved the HighCourt seeking an injunction.
2. A Crucial Legal Question for Pakistan’s Real Estate & Eviction Laws
The court had to decide something bigger than just one building:
> Who has the final say when a protected heritage building becomes dangerous—SBCA or the Provincial Government?
This question affects:
Landlords seeking eviction due to unsafe structures
Tenants living inside dangerous premises
Developers waiting for demolition permits
Owners facing conflicting notices from multiple departments
Heritage-listed properties across Sindh
And that’s why the ruling matters far beyond Maryam Mansion.
3. What the Court Examined (Without the Legal Clutter)
Justice Mohammad Abdur Rahman took a deep dive into the two laws:
🔹 UNDER THE HERITAGE ACT, 1994
The Court clarified one essential point:
> Declaring a building "protected heritage" does NOT automatically stop demolition.
The Heritage Department only gains the power to control demolition if:
1. It acquires the property (Section 7),
2. It becomes custodian (Section 7),
3. The owner signs a preservation agreement (Section 8), or
4. There’s a violation of an existing preservation agreement (Section 10).
In Maryam Mansion’s case?
No acquisition
No custodianship
No agreement
No preservation conditions
So the government could not legally issue a Show Cause Notice restraining demolition.
🔹 UNDER SBCO, 1979
SBCA’s authority over dangerous buildings is exclusive and absolute.
Section 2 states:
> “Nothing contained in any other law applies to matters regulated by this Ordinance.”
Section 14 gives SBCA the full power to:
inspect
declare
vacate
demolish
enforce
Even if the building is 100 years old.
The Court reinforced this using two earlier decisions:
PLD 2017 Sindh 690
Saad Aqil vs Province of Sindh (2023)
Both cases affirm:
Heritage preservation and dangerous building regulation operate independently.
And where life and safety are concerned, SBCA’s jurisdiction prevails.
4. The High Court’s Ruling — Clear, Firm, and Important
After cutting through the confusion, the Sindh High Court ruled:
The Provincial Government had NO authority to restrain demolition.
SBCA alone decides whether a building is dangerous.
Notices from the Heritage Department were suspended.
SBCA may issue demolition certificates without NOC from the Provincial Government.
The only legitimate role of the Heritage Department is to participate in the Technical Committee Meeting.
The Court awarded an interim injunction protecting the owner and allowing the demolition process to proceed—subject to a speaking order by the Technical Committee for Dangerous Buildings (TCDB).
5. What This Means for Landlords, Tenants & Developers in Karachi
This judgment quietly changed how tenant eviction laws in Pakistan will be interpreted when the building is unsafe.
Let’s simplify the takeaways.
A. Tenants cannot refuse to vacate a dangerous building
If SBCA declares a building dangerous:
Tenants MUST vacate
Eviction is legally justified
No one can hide behind “heritage protection”
SBCA can use force under Section 14(3)
This helps landlords who struggle with:
stubborn tenants
rent defaulters
occupants blocking redevelopment
B. Heritage declaration alone does NOT block demolition
A building becoming heritage is not a magical shield.
Unless:
the government buys it
or takes custody
or signs a preservation agreement
The owner remains free to proceed with demolition (subject to SBCA’s findings).
C. Developers get clarity
No need to chase:
multiple NOCs
conflicting instructions
endless bureaucratic loops
SBCA’s decision is final.
D. Safety of occupants becomes priority
The Court’s approach is practical:
> Human life and structural safety override heritage considerations—unless there is a valid preservation agreement.
That’s a major win for public safety.
6. How This Case Impacts Future Litigation in Sindh
Expect to see this judgment cited in:
eviction suits involving unsafe buildings
redevelopment disputes
challenges to conflicting government notices
injunction applications for demolition
arguments involving tenant refusal to vacate under the Rent Laws
It creates a new benchmark:
> Dangerous buildings are regulated by SBCA alone.
> Heritage status does not undermine SBCA’s authority.
7. Practical Advice for Property Owners Facing Similar Issues
Here’s how to stay ahead of trouble:
1. Always obtain SBCA’s Dangerous Building Report
This becomes your strongest legal weapon in:
eviction cases
demolition disputes
injunction hearings
2. Document every communication with tenants
Courts expect proof that you:
served notices
requested vacating
followed procedure
3. Ignore “verbal” instructions from any department
Only written, legally valid notices matter.
4. If a heritage notification appears—challenge it fast
Ask:
Is there a preservation agreement?
Has the government acquired it?
Are you bound by Section 7 or 8?
If not, the notification cannot stop demolition.
5. Never demolish without the TCDB’s speaking order
This protects you from:
penal consequences
avoidable litigation
administrative backlash
8. FAQs on Dangerous Buildings in Pakistan
Q1: Can tenants refuse to vacate if SBCA calls the building dangerous?
No. Under Section 14 of SBCO, SBCA can order eviction and even use force. A tenant cannot legally resist if the structure is unsafe.
Q2: If a building becomes “protected heritage,” can the owner still demolish it?
Yes—unless the government has:
acquired the building, or
entered into a preservation agreement
A mere notification under Section 6 does not block demolition.
Q3: Can the Heritage Department stop the demolition through a notice?
Not unless there is:
a breach of an agreement under Section 8
guardianship under Section 7
Otherwise, such notices have no legal force.
Q4: Does SBCA need permission from the Provincial Government to demolish a heritage building?
No. SBCA is fully empowered to regulate dangerous buildings without seeking NOCs.
Q5: What happens if two departments give conflicting orders?
This judgment settles it:
SBCA’s order prevails in all matters related to dangerous buildings.
Q6: Is this case helpful for eviction suits involving unsafe buildings?
Absolutely. It strengthens the landlord’s position when a tenant refuses to vacate despite structural danger.
Final Note
This judgment is a reminder that the law—when applied carefully—can bring clarity to messy, overlapping bureaucratic conflicts. And for anyone dealing with redevelopment, or structural safety issues in Karachi, the Faisal Amjad case is now essential reading.
Imagine operating a business on government land for years you built on it, invested in it, expanded it. And then one morning you find a notice: “Your lease expired years ago. Vacate immediately.”
You rush to court hoping for relief.
You argue discrimination.
You argue unfair treatment.
You argue that others around you got their leases renewed, so why not you?
But the Court looks at your file… and everything collapses in seconds.
This is exactly what happened in Muhammad Siddique v. Federation of Pakistan (C.P. No. D-4571/2019),— a 2025 judgment from the High Court of Sindh, and one that every tenant, landlord, lessee, and property owner in Pakistan needs to understand.
Because this case isn’t just about one plot at Karachi’s West Wharf.
It’s about three core questions:
What happens when a lease expires but the tenant doesn’t leave?
When is someone declared an unauthorized occupant under Pakistan law?
Can a tenant force the government to renew a lease by claiming discrimination?
Let’s break this down clearly without jargon, without confusion so that anyone dealing with lease renewal or tenant eviction in Pakistan knows exactly where they stand
Background: A Lease, A Hotel, and a Long Silence
The petitioner, Muhammad Siddique, was allotted Plot No. C-18 (405 sq. meters) at the Boat Building Yard, West Wharf, Karachi.
His lease was:
issued for Boat Building Industry & allied port-related work
starting from 26.05.2004
expiring on 25.05.2014
This is where the story turns.
Instead of using the land for port-related work… he built a hotel.
Shops were added.
The first floor was used for residential purposes.
All in violation of the approved plan and lease terms.
And when the lease expired in 2014, he stayed on.
For five years he took no legal action until filing this petition in 2019, asking the High Court to:
renew his lease,
stop eviction proceedings, and
declare the non-renewal “discriminatory.”
The respondents (government authorities) replied sharply:
The lease expired long ago.
The use of land violates the approved purpose.
A final show-cause notice was already issued.
The petitioner concealed facts from the Court.
He is now an unauthorized occupant under the law.
Key Legal Issue 1: Laches “You slept on your rights for too long.”
The Court’s first and strongest ground was laches.
The petition was filed 5 years after the lease expired, without any reasonable explanation.
The Court cited multiple Supreme Court precedents, including:
PLJ 2012 SC 289 (State Bank of Pakistan v. Imtiaz Ali Khan)
PLD 2007 SC 472 (Jawad Mir Muhammad v. Haroon Mirza)
2014 PLC (C.S.) 1292 (Asghar Khan v. Province of Sindh)
All confirming one principle:
A constitutional petition cannot rescue someone who slept on their rights.
This alone was enough for dismissal.
Key Legal Issue 2: Unauthorized Occupation Under the 1962 Ordinance
Once the lease ended in 2014, Siddique’s legal status changed.
Under Port Authorities Lands and Buildings (Recovery of Possession) Ordinance, 1962, Section 2(h)(ii):
> “Unauthorized occupant means a person who remains in occupation after expiry of lease.”
The Court held:
Siddique became an unauthorized occupant
Authorities were legally empowered to evict him
His misuse of land (hotel, shops, residences) made things worse
This is a critical lesson for readers:
After a lease expires, continued possession is not “tenancy” it becomes “unauthorized occupation.”
And eviction becomes a matter of statutory right, not discretion.
Key Legal Issue 3: Concealment of Material Facts
The Court was particularly critical of the petitioner for:
hiding the 2019 show-cause notice
hiding violations of the building plan
hiding misuse of the premises
attempting to create a false narrative
In constitutional jurisdiction, the petitioner must come with clean hands.
The Court cited:
2010 CLC 1798 (Lahore) concealment is fatal
2003 MLD 1543 relief cannot be granted when facts are hidden
When the Court senses dishonesty, constitutional relief becomes impossible.
Key Legal Issue 4: No Parity in Illegality (Article 25 Misuse)
The petitioner argued that:
> “Other plots in the area got their leases renewed — I am being discriminated.”
The Court replied clearly:
Article 25 (equality) cannot be used to demand equal treatment in illegality.
If another lessee illegally got a renewal, you cannot claim the same.
This principle also appears in 1995 SCMR 797 (Irshad Bibi v. Member BOR).
Equal protection only applies to lawful circumstances, not unlawful privileges.
Key Legal Issue 5: Lease Renewal Is Not a Vested Right
A very important conclusion:
You cannot force the government to renew a lease unless the lease contract gives you that right.
Renewal is not automatic.
It is not a constitutional right.
It is not guaranteed even if other people around you got it.
Renewal depends on:
compliance with the lease
lawful use of the property
timely request
Public interest
government discretion
A person who misuses public land cannot demand renewal as a matter of right.
Key Legal Issue 6: Disputed Questions of Fact → Writ Petition Not Maintainable
The Court noted that this case involved:
factual disputes
evidentiary questions
inspection of unauthorized structures
validity of the show-cause notice
nature of commercial use
And held that:
Article 199 writ jurisdiction is not meant for fact-finding.
Such disputes must go to:
civil court
trial court
or appropriate statutory forums
The High Court rightly refused to conduct a factual inquiry.
Final Holding: Petition Dismissed
After analyzing all legal points, the Court concluded:
the petition was barred by laches
the petitioner was an unauthorized occupant
he violated lease terms
he concealed material facts
disputed questions couldn't be adjudicated
no right to lease renewal existed
Therefore: The petition was dismissed.
A decisive outcome — and an instructive one.
Practical Lessons for Tenants & Leaseholders in Pakistan
This judgment teaches some essential lessons:
1. A lease must be renewed before expiry — not years later.
Delay kills your legal rights.
2. Misuse of leased property destroys your case.
Commercial activity beyond the sanctioned use voids your protection.
3. You cannot demand equal treatment in illegality.
Other people’s illegal benefits don’t strengthen your claim.
4. Unauthorized occupation invites eviction.
Once a lease expires, you lose legal protection.
5. Concealing facts is fatal in constitutional petitions.
Courts never reward dishonesty.
6. Writ petitions cannot resolve factual disputes.
Use the correct legal forum for evidence-based matters.
This judgment will guide many future disputes involving:
tenant eviction laws in Pakistan
lease renewal and cancellation
unauthorized commercial use of government land
Article 199 constitutional petitions
misuse of public land
FAQs: Lease Renewal & Tenant Eviction in Pakistan
Q1: Can a tenant force the government to renew a lease?
No. Renewal is not a guaranteed right. It depends on compliance, lawful use, and government discretion.
Q2: What happens when a lease expires and the tenant stays?
The tenant becomes an unauthorized occupant and can be lawfully evicted.
Q3: Can discrimination be claimed if others got renewals?
No. You cannot seek parity in illegality. Article 25 only protects lawful equal rights.
Q4: Can the High Court stop eviction under Article 199?
Only if:
the petitioner has clean hands
no misuse is involved
no factual disputes exist
the petition is filed without delay
Otherwise, relief is denied.
Q5: Is misuse of land a ground to deny lease renewal?
Absolutely yes. Unauthorized commercial or residential use is a serious breach.
Q6: Can constitutional petitions resolve property fact disputes?
No. High Courts do not conduct trials; factual issues must go to civil courts.
Conclusion
This 2025 Sindh High Court judgment is a powerful reminder:
Public land is held in trust. Misuse, delay, concealment, and expired leases cannot be protected under Article 199.
He raised them. He paid for their education. He opened the doors of his home to them.
Years later, they locked him out.
This isn’t a movie script. This is a real case from DHA Karachi that ended up before the highest court of the land — the Supreme Court of Pakistan.
The father, a retired doctor, filed a criminal complaint against his own children under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, claiming they’d unlawfully dispossessed him from his house. What followed was a legal battle that reshaped how Pakistan’s courts interpret “illegal dispossession” in family and eviction disputes.
Let’s break it down clearly — what happened, how the Court ruled, and why it matters for every property owner and tenant in Pakistan.
The Case at a Glance
Case: Abbas Asif Zaman v. The State
Court: Supreme Court of Pakistan
Bench: Justice Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Justice Salahuddin Panhwar, Justice Ishtiaq Ibrahim
Date of Judgment 26 September 2025
Property: House at 24-B, Sunset Boulevard, DHA Phase II Extension, Karachi
Law Invoked: Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 (Sections 3, 4, 7 & 8)
The complainant — a retired medical doctor — alleged that his daughter and son, from a dissolved marriage, had ousted him from his house. He claimed years of support had been repaid with abuse and dispossession.
He filed a criminal complaint under the Act, and the trial court issued bailable warrants against the children. The High Court upheld that decision. The children appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Legal Question
Can a father file a criminal complaint under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 against his own children living in the family home — when they’ve been residing there with his permission since birth?
Or in simpler terms:
Is this a criminal “illegal dispossession” case, or a civil family dispute?
The Court’s Analysis
1. The Spirit of the Act
The Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 was enacted to protect lawful owners and occupiers from land grabbers — people who forcibly take over property without legal authority.
The Supreme Court has previously clarified in landmark rulings like:
Niaz Ahmed v. Aijaz Ahmed (PLD 2024 SC 1152)
Mst. Gulshan Bibi v. Muhammad Sadiq (PLD 2016 SC 769)
Shaikh Muhammad Naseem v. Mst. Farida Gul (2016 SCMR 1931)
Mst. Inayatan Khatoon v. Muhammad Ramzan (2012 SCMR 229)
…the Act isn’t limited to qabza groups. Anyone who forcibly intrudes or unlawfully controls another’s property may be prosecuted — but only if the ingredients of the offence are met.
2. The Missing Ingredient: Force
Section 3(3) of the Act is clear:
> “Whoever forcibly and wrongfully dispossesses any owner or occupier of any property… shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years or with fine or both…”
The key word is “forcibly.”
Here, the father himself admitted in his appeal:
> “As a result, the complainant and his wife moved out, leaving the respondents in occupation of the property.”
No physical force. No trespass. No intimidation. Just a breakdown in family relations. That’s not enough to trigger a criminal case.
3. Family Bonds vs. Penal Law
The Court highlighted that family life is constitutionally protected in Pakistan:
Article 9: Security of person
Article 14: Dignity and privacy of home
Article 31: Islamic way of life
Article 35: Protection of family
Using a criminal statute designed to combat land mafias inside a family setting would distort the law and risk “over-criminalisation.”
The Verdict — A Landmark Clarification
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of the lower courts.
The complaint under Section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act was dismissed.
The father’s ownership rights were affirmed.
The daughter’s right to reside in the family home, as a woman under domestic law, was also protected.
The Court drew a clear line:
> “The Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 was enacted to shield persons in settled possession from land grabbers and violent or lawless ouster, not to furnish a shortcut for private parties in domestic or intra-family disputes.”
Civil Remedies, Not Criminal Shortcuts
The Court was careful to point out that this does not give children immunity if they forcibly evict or harm their parents. If there’s clear evidence of force or intimidation, the Act can apply even against family.
But where possession flows from permissive residence, the appropriate path is:
Civil suits (e.g., for possession, injunction, partition)
Domestic violence protection frameworks (e.g., Sindh Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection) Act, 2013)
Senior citizens’ welfare laws, where applicable
This is a crucial procedural distinction for anyone dealing with tenant eviction or property control disputes in Pakistan.
Protection of Women and Elders in the Home
The Court also linked this case to broader family protection frameworks. Under the Sindh Domestic Violence Act, women and vulnerable persons have the right of residence in the shared household.
It reiterated the Islamic and cultural principle of respect and protection for parents and women. The judgment even quoted:
> “Among you the most respectable is the one who respects women, and the most disrespect is the one who disrespects women.” — Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)
A Comparative Perspective
The Court looked at how other countries address similar issues:
India: Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007
Bangladesh: Parents Maintenance Act, 2013
Sri Lanka, Nepal, Singapore, and Canada have similar civil-first mechanisms — not criminal shortcuts.
This reflects a global trend: family conflicts over property are best handled through civil and protective laws, not through criminal charges.
Practical Insights for Property Owners & Tenants
1. Illegal dispossession requires evidence of force.
If someone has been living in a property with permission, their continued residence doesn’t automatically become a criminal offence.
2. Family disputes ≠ land grabbing.
The Supreme Court has drawn a clear boundary between qabza group activity and family-based occupation.
3. Civil courts are the right forum.
If you want to remove someone who has been living permissively, file a civil suit for possession, injunction, or partition — not an IDA complaint.
4. Tenants and residents have rights too.
Especially women and vulnerable dependents have legal protection to reside in shared homes.
5. Domestic violence laws provide residence protection.
In cases involving parents, children, spouses or dependents, protective frameworks apply.
6. Senior citizens should use specific welfare laws where available for maintenance and care claims, not criminal complaints under the Illegal Dispossession Act.
FAQs — Tenant Eviction & Illegal Dispossession in Pakistan
Q1: What is illegal dispossession in Pakistan?
A: Under the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005, it refers to forcibly and wrongfully taking over someone’s property without legal authority. Force or wrongful control is a key ingredient.
Q2: Can family members be charged under the Act?
A: Yes — but only if they forcibly evict the owner. If they’re living there permissively, it’s a civil matter, not a criminal one.
Q3: How can a property owner evict a family member legally?
A: Through a civil suit for possession, injunction, or partition. If applicable, domestic violence laws may also apply.
Q4: What if the occupant is a tenant?
A: Tenant eviction must follow due process under tenancy laws or rent controller orders. You cannot use force or bypass legal procedures.
Q5: Can I file a criminal case directly?
A: Only if you have evidence of forcible dispossession. Otherwise, the Court may dismiss it like in this case.
Q6: What are my options if I’m a parent being mistreated by adult children?
A: You can:
File a civil suit for possession,
Approach family/domestic violence protection committees,
Use senior citizens’ welfare laws where applicable.
Final Word — A Balanced Approach
This judgment is a landmark in tenant eviction and property control law in Pakistan. It draws a bright line between criminal land grabbing and family disputes, ensuring:
Owners are protected,
Tenants and dependents are not criminalised unfairly,
Families have room for legal resolution without destroying their bonds.
If you’re a property owner, tenant, or dealing with a family property dispute in Pakistan, this case is a must-read.
Case Reference: Abbas Asif Zaman v. The State, Criminal Petition No. 61-K of 2025, decided on 26-09-2025
Imagine this: you own a property, but someone occupies it without legal rights, refusing to leave. What do you do? In Pakistan, wrongful possession disputes are common, and a recent 2025 Sindh High Court ruling (Civil Revision Applications Nos. 316 & 317 of 2016) offers critical clarity on wrongful possession laws in Pakistan. This case, involving a disputed property in Hyderabad, highlights the legal principles governing wrongful possession, mesne profits, and the burden of proof in property disputes. At Asif Legal Services, we break down this landmark judgment to empower property owners with actionable insights.
Case Summary: Noor Nabi v. Mst. Fatli & Others
In 2016, Noor Nabi filed two civil revision applications challenging a consolidated judgment from the 9th Additional District Judge, Hyderabad, which upheld the trial court’s 2015 decision. The dispute centered on a 599 sq. ft. plot in Hyderabad, where Noor Nabi claimed he had an agreement to purchase the property from the late Muhammad Arab in 2004 for Rs. 1,20,000, with Rs. 100,000 paid as earnest money and possession partially delivered. After Muhammad Arab’s death in 2005, his heirs (the respondents) denied the agreement, alleging it was forged and that Noor Nabi illegally trespassed in 2009, prompting an FIR and a countersuit for possession and mesne profits.
The trial court dismissed Noor Nabi’s suit for specific performance (enforcing the alleged sale agreement) and granted the respondents’ suit for possession and mesne profits of Rs. 3,000 per month from December 2009. The appellate court upheld this, correcting the trial court’s error on compulsory registration but affirming that the agreement was unproven due to inconsistencies. The Sindh High Court, in its 2025 judgment, dismissed Noor Nabi’s revisions, maintaining the lower courts’ rulings but modifying the mesne profits award to require a formal inquiry under Order XX Rule 12, CPC.
This case underscores key aspects of wrongful possession laws in Pakistan, particularly around wrongful possession, proof of agreements, and the calculation of mesne profits.
Authoritative Ruling: Key Legal Principles
The Sindh High Court’s judgment clarified several legal principles critical to property owners rights in Pakistan and wrongful possession disputes:
1. Burden of Proof in Property Disputes:
The court emphasized that the party claiming a sale agreement (Noor Nabi) bears the burden of proving its execution, payment, and possession. Contradictions in Noor Nabi’s evidence—such as conflicting dates of payment and possession, discrepancies in witness testimonies, and the lack of a scribe’s confirmation—rendered the agreement unproven. This highlights that oral or poorly documented agreements face strict scrutiny in court.
2. Wrongful Possession and Mesne Profits:
The court confirmed that wrongful possession —occupation without legal right—is the foundation for claiming mesne profits (compensation for unauthorized use of property). The respondents proved Noor Nabi’s possession was unlawful, supported by an FIR and witness accounts of his trespass in 2009. The court defined mesne profits under Section 2(12), CPC, as profits a wrongful occupant received or could have received with ordinary diligence, excluding improvements they made.
3. Inquiry for Mesne Profits:
While the trial court awarded Rs. 3,000 per month as mesne profits, the High Court ruled this premature without a formal inquiry under Order XX Rule 12, CPC. This provision requires courts to assess fair rent based on economic conditions and property specifics, ensuring accurate compensation for landlords. The case was remanded for this inquiry, to be completed within three months.
4. Civil vs. Criminal Proceedings:
The court reiterated that criminal court findings (e.g., Noor Nabi’s acquittal in related trespass charges) do not bind civil courts. Civil disputes, including eviction cases, are decided on the balance of probabilities, unlike the stricter “beyond reasonable doubt” standard in criminal law. This distinction is crucial for landlords navigating parallel legal actions.
5. Concurrent Findings of Fact:
The High Court declined to interfere with the lower courts’ concurrent findings, as they were neither perverse nor based on misreading evidence. This reinforces the limited scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, CPC, emphasizing that courts won’t reweigh evidence unless there’s a clear jurisdictional error.
Practical Insights for property owners and unlawful occupants
This ruling offers valuable lessons for navigating property disputes in Pakistan:
- For Landlords:
- Document Agreements Clearly: Oral agreements or unregistered documents are risky. Ensure all property transactions, including leases or sales, are documented and, where required, registered to avoid disputes.
- Act Promptly: The respondents’ swift action (filing an FIR and suit after the 2009 trespass) strengthened their case. Delays in addressing unauthorized possession can weaken claims for mesne profits or eviction.
- Understand Mesne Profits: If a tenant or occupant wrongfully holds your property, you’re entitled to mesne profits. However, courts may require an inquiry to determine fair compensation, so maintain records of local rental rates.
- For Tenants or Occupants:
- Prove Lawful Possession: If you claim possession based on an agreement, ensure you have credible, consistent evidence. Inconsistent testimonies or lack of documentation, as in Noor Nabi’s case, can undermine your defense.
- Avoid Unauthorized Actions: Breaking into or occupying property without clear legal rights can lead to eviction and financial liability for mesne profits, as seen here.
- General Advice:
- Engage legal counsel early to assess your case’s strength, especially in disputes involving wrongful dispossession laws in Pakistan.
- Understand the difference between civil and criminal proceedings to strategize effectively. For instance, an acquittal in a criminal trespass case doesn’t guarantee success in a civil dispossession suit.
This case also highlights the importance of Sindh High Court civil dispossession precedents in shaping property law. Property owners and unlawful occupants must stay informed about such rulings to protect their rights.
FAQs:
1. What is wrongful possession under Pakistani law?
Wrongful possession occurs when someone occupies a property without legal authorization, such as a valid lease or sale agreement. In the Noor Nabi case, the court found the occupant’s possession unlawful due to an unproven agreement and evidence of trespass.
2. What are mesne profits, and how are they calculated?
Mesne profits are compensation owed to a property owner for profits lost due to wrongful possession. Under Section 2(12), CPC, they include actual or potential profits (with ordinary diligence) plus interest, excluding improvements by the occupant. Courts may order an inquiry under Order XX Rule 12, CPC, to determine fair rent based on market conditions.
3. Can a criminal acquittal help in a civil case?
No. As clarified in this case, civil courts assess disputes on the balance of probabilities, while criminal courts require proof beyond reasonable doubt. A criminal acquittal, like Noor Nabi’s, doesn’t bind a civil court deciding possession.
4. Do all property agreements need registration in Pakistan?
Not always. The Sindh High Court clarified that an agreement to sell doesn’t require compulsory registration unless it creates a present right in the property. However, unregistered agreements face higher scrutiny for proof of execution.
5. How can property owners ensure successful possession?
property owner should:
- Maintain clear, registered agreements.
- Document unauthorized possession promptly (e.g., via FIR or notices).
- Seek legal advice to file for possession and mesne profits under relevant laws, like the CPC.
6. What should buyers do to avoid ownership and possession disputes?
Buyers should ensure they have valid, documented agreements, avoid unauthorized actions (e.g., breaking into property), and maintain evidence of payments or possession rights to defend against possession claims.
When Your Dream Home Becomes a Nightmare: Lessons from Muhammad Irfan v. M/s. Hassan Construction
Imagine settling into your new apartment in Hyderabad, envisioning a safe haven for your family. But then, you notice cracks in the walls, hear whispers of an unauthorized extra floor, and learn the rooftop—meant for residents—was sold off. Your dream home is now a safety hazard. This was the chilling reality for Muhammad Irfan, whose legal battle against a rogue builder in Muhammad Irfan v. M/s. Hassan Construction (2025 Karachi 162) became a landmark case for tenant eviction laws in Pakistan. At Asif Legal Services, we unpack this case to empower property owners with the knowledge to protect their rights and ensure safety in an increasingly complex real estate landscape.
Case Summary: A Tenanpt’s Fight Against Illegal Construction
In 2007, Muhammad Irfan booked a flat in the Oasis Apartment project in Hyderabad’s Kohsar Housing Scheme, developed by M/s. Hassan Construction. The project was approved by the Sindh Building Control Authority (SBCA) under a No-Objection Certificate (NOC) that permitted a ground floor plus three additional floors, totaling 39 flats. The NOC also mandated safety features like fire extinguishers, water hydrants, and a 4-foot parapet wall, and explicitly prohibited selling the rooftop, reserving it for residents’ joint use.
But Irfan soon discovered alarming violations. The builder had constructed an illegal fourth floor, sold the rooftop to third parties, and failed to install mandatory safety systems, putting residents at risk. When Irfan filed a civil suit, the Trial Court dismissed his claims, arguing he should have approached the SBCA first. The Appellate Court upheld this, claiming the contract between Irfan and the builder didn’t mention safety features or the rooftop, so his claims were invalid.
Undeterred, Irfan took his case to the High Court under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), which allows revisional jurisdiction to correct jurisdictional errors or material irregularities by lower courts. Represented by advocate Khalid Mustafa Shoro, Irfan argued that both lower courts misread evidence, ignored witness testimonies, and misapplied the law. The builder’s defense, led by Tahir Nisar Rajput, relied on vague denials and ad hominem attacks, offering no witnesses or evidence to counter Irfan’s claims.
The High Court, presided over by Justice Riazat Ali Sahar, scrutinized the case, focusing on whether the concurrent findings of the lower courts could be disturbed. The pivotal issue was: Did the builder violate the NOC by constructing an illegal floor and selling the roof, endangering residents?
Authoritative Ruling: Upholding Property Owner's Rights and Public Safety
Justice Sahar’s ruling was a game-changer for tenant rights in Pakistan and a stern warning to builders flouting regulations. Under Section 115 CPC, the High Court has discretionary power to intervene when lower courts exercise jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. The court found that both the Trial and Appellate Courts had failed to consider critical evidence, including:
1. Witness Testimonies: SBCA Assistant Director Jameel-ur-Rehman confirmed the NOC limited construction to three floors above ground and prohibited roof sales. A court-appointed engineer, Azeemuddin Ansari, inspected the site and reported cracks, seepage, and an illegal fourth floor with no structural calculations, deeming it unsafe.
2. Evasive Denials: The builder’s written statement offered no specific rebuttal to Irfan’s allegations, only vague denials and personal attacks, which, under Rules 3-5 of Order VIII CPC, were deemed admissions of the facts alleged.
3. Statutory Obligations: The NOC, issued under the Sindh Buildings Control Ordinance, 1979, imposed a public duty on the builder to comply with safety and structural standards. The court clarified that such obligations extend beyond the SBCA to the general public, including Property Owners like Irfan.
The High Court overturned the lower courts’ findings on Issue No. 5, which questioned whether the builder violated the NOC by constructing the fourth floor and selling the roof. The ruling included:
- Demolition Order: The illegal fourth floor must be demolished as per the 1979 Ordinance, with the builder bearing costs.
- Roof Restoration: The rooftop must be returned to residents for joint use, as mandated by the NOC.
- Compensation for Third Parties: If third-party rights were created on the illegal floor, the builder must compensate them fully before demolition.
- Accountability Measures: The SBCA and other officials were directed to initiate civil, disciplinary, or criminal proceedings against the builder and negligent SBCA officials.
- Costs Imposed: The builder was ordered to pay all legal costs, reflecting the court’s disapproval of their misconduct.
This ruling established a critical principle: Builders owe a legal duty to the public, not just regulatory bodies. Property Owners can file civil suits in Pakistan directly to challenge illegal construction in Pakistan, without first approaching the SBCA, reinforcing their building constitution laws in Pakistan.
Practical Insights for Property Owners
The Muhammad Irfan case offers actionable lessons for navigating property disputes in Pakistan and protecting yourself under building constitution laws in Pakistan:
1. Verify Building Compliance: Always request the NOC from the SBCA before renting or buying. Confirm the approved number of floors, safety features (e.g., fire extinguishers, hydrants), and rooftop usage rights. Non-compliance can endanger lives and violate your rights.
2. Know Your Legal Standing: Property Owners have locus standi to challenge illegal constructions in court, as builders’ obligations under the 1979 Ordinance extend to the public. You don’t need to exhaust administrative remedies with the SBCA before filing a civil suit.
3. Document Evidence: Keep copies of agreements, NOCs, and communications with builders or Property Owners. In this case, Irfan’s evidence—SBCA testimony, engineer reports, and the NOC—was pivotal.
4. Challenge Evasive Defenses: Builders or landlords who respond with vague denials, as M/s. Hassan Construction did, may be admitting fault under CPC rules. Consult a lawyer to leverage this in court.
5. Prioritize Safety: Illegal constructions, like unauthorized floors or missing safety systems, pose risks of collapse or fire. Report violations to the SBCA or seek legal action promptly to protect yourself and others.
The case also underscores the SBCA’s role in enforcing building standards. However, its failure to act doesn’t absolve builders of liability, nor does it bar owner from seeking justice directly in court. This empowers buyers to hold builders accountable for SBCA violations.
Reader-Friendly FAQs: Building Construction Laws and Illegal Construction
1. Can Property Owners in Pakistan sue builders for illegal construction?
Yes, Property Owners can file civil suits to challenge illegal construction in Pakistan, as seen in Muhammad Irfan v. M/s. Hassan Construction. The High Court confirmed that Property Owners don’t need to approach the SBCA before seeking judicial relief.
2. What is the Sindh Building Control Authority (SBCA), and what does it do?
The SBCA regulates construction in Sindh, issuing NOCs that specify approved plans, safety features, and conditions like rooftop usage. Violations, such as unauthorized floors, can lead to demolition or legal action under the 1979 Ordinance.
3. What happens if a builder sells a rooftop illegally?
If a builder sells a rooftop in violation of an NOC, as in this case, courts can order it restored for residents’ joint use. Affected tenants can seek legal remedies, and third parties may be compensated by the builder.
4. How can I protect myself from unsafe buildings in Pakistan?
Request the NOC, verify safety features (e.g., fire extinguishers, hydrants), and inspect for structural issues like cracks or seepage. Consult a lawyer to review agreements and report violations to the SBCA or courts.
5. What is Section 115 of the CPC, and how does it relate to tenant disputes?
Section 115 allows High Courts to revise lower court decisions for jurisdictional errors or material irregularities. In this case, it enabled the court to correct misinterpretations of evidence, protecting Property Owners rights in Pakistan.
6. Why This Case Matters for Pakistan’s Property Owners and Beyond
The Muhammad Irfan v. M/s. Hassan Construction case is a wake-up call for tenants, homeowners, and regulators across Pakistan. It highlights the dangers of illegal construction in Pakistan —from structural risks to financial exploitation—and empowers individuals to fight back. By clarifying that owners can directly approach courts, the ruling strengthens building and construction laws in Pakistan and ensures builders face consequences for endangering lives.
This case also exposes gaps in enforcement by the Sindh Building Control Authority. While the SBCA is tasked with protecting the public, its inaction doesn’t shield builders from liability. Property Owners and buyers must stay vigilant, verify NOCs, and demand compliance with safety standards
Imagine settling into your new apartment in Hyderabad, envisioning a safe haven for your family. But then, you notice cracks in the walls, hear whispers of an unauthorized extra floor, and learn the rooftop—meant for residents—was sold off. Your dream home is now a safety hazard. This was the chilling reality for Muhammad Irfan, whose legal battle against a rogue builder in Muhammad Irfan v. M/s. Hassan Construction (2025 Karachi 162) became a landmark case for tenant eviction laws in Pakistan. At Asif Legal Services, we unpack this case to empower property owners with the knowledge to protect their rights and ensure safety in an increasingly complex real estate landscape.
Case Summary: A Tenanpt’s Fight Against Illegal Construction
In 2007, Muhammad Irfan booked a flat in the Oasis Apartment project in Hyderabad’s Kohsar Housing Scheme, developed by M/s. Hassan Construction. The project was approved by the Sindh Building Control Authority (SBCA) under a No-Objection Certificate (NOC) that permitted a ground floor plus three additional floors, totaling 39 flats. The NOC also mandated safety features like fire extinguishers, water hydrants, and a 4-foot parapet wall, and explicitly prohibited selling the rooftop, reserving it for residents’ joint use.
But Irfan soon discovered alarming violations. The builder had constructed an illegal fourth floor, sold the rooftop to third parties, and failed to install mandatory safety systems, putting residents at risk. When Irfan filed a civil suit, the Trial Court dismissed his claims, arguing he should have approached the SBCA first. The Appellate Court upheld this, claiming the contract between Irfan and the builder didn’t mention safety features or the rooftop, so his claims were invalid.
Undeterred, Irfan took his case to the High Court under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), which allows revisional jurisdiction to correct jurisdictional errors or material irregularities by lower courts. Represented by advocate Khalid Mustafa Shoro, Irfan argued that both lower courts misread evidence, ignored witness testimonies, and misapplied the law. The builder’s defense, led by Tahir Nisar Rajput, relied on vague denials and ad hominem attacks, offering no witnesses or evidence to counter Irfan’s claims.
The High Court, presided over by Justice Riazat Ali Sahar, scrutinized the case, focusing on whether the concurrent findings of the lower courts could be disturbed. The pivotal issue was: Did the builder violate the NOC by constructing an illegal floor and selling the roof, endangering residents?
Authoritative Ruling: Upholding Property Owner's Rights and Public Safety
Justice Sahar’s ruling was a game-changer for tenant rights in Pakistan and a stern warning to builders flouting regulations. Under Section 115 CPC, the High Court has discretionary power to intervene when lower courts exercise jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. The court found that both the Trial and Appellate Courts had failed to consider critical evidence, including:
1. Witness Testimonies: SBCA Assistant Director Jameel-ur-Rehman confirmed the NOC limited construction to three floors above ground and prohibited roof sales. A court-appointed engineer, Azeemuddin Ansari, inspected the site and reported cracks, seepage, and an illegal fourth floor with no structural calculations, deeming it unsafe.
2. Evasive Denials: The builder’s written statement offered no specific rebuttal to Irfan’s allegations, only vague denials and personal attacks, which, under Rules 3-5 of Order VIII CPC, were deemed admissions of the facts alleged.
3. Statutory Obligations: The NOC, issued under the Sindh Buildings Control Ordinance, 1979, imposed a public duty on the builder to comply with safety and structural standards. The court clarified that such obligations extend beyond the SBCA to the general public, including Property Owners like Irfan.
The High Court overturned the lower courts’ findings on Issue No. 5, which questioned whether the builder violated the NOC by constructing the fourth floor and selling the roof. The ruling included:
- Demolition Order: The illegal fourth floor must be demolished as per the 1979 Ordinance, with the builder bearing costs.
- Roof Restoration: The rooftop must be returned to residents for joint use, as mandated by the NOC.
- Compensation for Third Parties: If third-party rights were created on the illegal floor, the builder must compensate them fully before demolition.
- Accountability Measures: The SBCA and other officials were directed to initiate civil, disciplinary, or criminal proceedings again to pay all legal costs, reflecting the court’s disapproval of their misconduct.
This ruling established a critical principle: Builders owe a legal duty to the public, not just regulatory bodies. Property Owners can file civil suits in Pakistan directly to challenge illegal construction in Pakistan, without first approaching the SBCA, reinforcing their building constitution laws in Pakistan.
Practical Insights for Property Owners
The Muhammad Irfan case offers actionable lessons for navigating property disputes in Pakistan and protecting yourself under building constitution laws in Pakistan:
1. Verify Building Compliance: Always request the NOC from the SBCA before renting or buying. Confirm the approved number of floors, safety features (e.g., fire extinguishers, hydrants), and rooftop usage rights. Non-compliance can endanger lives and violate your rights.
2. Know Your Legal Standing: Property Owners have locus standi to challenge illegal constructions in court, as builders’ obligations under the 1979 Ordinance extend to the public. You don’t need to exhaust administrative remedies with builders or Property Owners. In this case, Irfan’s evidence—SBCA testimony, engineer reports, and the NOC—was pivotal.
4. Challenge Evasive Defenses: Builders or landlords who respond with vague denials, as M/s. Hassan Construction did, may be admitting fault under CPC rules. Consult a lawyer to leverage this in court.
5. Prioritize Safety: Illegal constructions, like unauthorized floors or missing safety systems, pose risks of collapse or fire. Report violations to the SBCA or seek legal action promptly to protect yourself and others.
The case also underscores the SBCA’s role in enforcing building standards. However, its failure to act doesn’t absolve builders of liability, nor does it bar owner from seeking justice directly in court. This empowers buyers to hold builders accountable for SBCA violations.
Reader-Friendly FAQs: Building Construction Laws and Illegal Construction
1. Can Property Owners in Pakistan sue builders for illegal construction?
Yes, Property Owners can file civil suits to challenge illegal construction in Pakistan, as seen in Muhammad Irfan v. M/s. Hassan Construction. The High Court confirmed that Property Owners don’t need to approach the SBCA before seeking judicial relief.
2. What is the Sindh Building Control Authority (SBCA), and what does it do?
The SBCA regulates construction in Sindh, issuing NOCs that specify approved plans, safety features, and conditions like rooftop usage. Violations, such as unauthorized floors, can lead to demolition or legal action under the 1979 Ordinance.
3. What happens if a builder sells a rooftop illegally?
If a builder sells a rooftop in violation of an NOC, as in this case, courts can order it restored for residents’ joint use. Affected tenants can seek legal remedies, and third parties may be compensated by the builder.
4. How can I protect myself from unsafe buildings in Pakistan?
Request the NOC, verify safety features (e.g., fire extinguishers, hydrants), and inspect for structural issues like cracks or seepage. Consult a lawyer to review agreements and report violations to the SBCA or courts.
5. What is Section 115 of the CPC, and how does it relate to tenant disputes?
Section 115 allows High Courts to revise lower court decisions for jurisdictional errors or material irregularities. In this case, it enabled the court to correct misinterpretations of evidence, protecting Property Owners rights in Pakistan.
6. Why This Case Matters for Pakistan’s Property Owners and Beyond
The Muhammad Irfan v. M/s. Hassan Construction case is a wake-up call for tenants, homeowners, and regulators across Pakistan. It highlights the dangers of illegal construction in Pakistan —from structural risks to financial exploitation—and empowers individuals to fight back. By clarifying that owners can directly approach courts, the ruling strengthens building and construction laws in Pakistan and ensures builders face consequences for endangering lives.
This case also exposes gaps in enforcement by the Sindh Building Control Authority. While the SBCA is tasked with protecting the public, its inaction doesn’t shield builders from liability. Property Owners and buyers must stay vigilant, verify NOCs, and demand compliance with safety standards
In a significant legal battle in Karachi, Pakistan residents of the Gulshan-e-Faisal Cooperative Housing Society have challenged the construction of a high-rise commercial/residential building on Plot No. C-1/5, raising critical questions about land use, zoning regulations, and the rights of residents to preserve the character of their neighborhood. The case, heard by Justice Muhammad Karim Khan Agha, centers on a petition filed by residents seeking to declare the approval of a multistory building plan, the restoration of said plan, and the amalgamation of plots as illegal. The court's ruling, dismissing the petition as not maintainable under Article 199 of the Constitution, underscores the complexities of land use disputes and the limitations of constitutional jurisdiction in resolving factual conflicts. This summary explores the petitioners’ claims, the respondents’ counterarguments, and the court’s reasoning, offering insights into the legal principles at play.
Background of the Dispute
The petitioners, residents of Gulshan-e-Faisal Cooperative Housing Society in Bath Island, Karachi, filed a petition to halt the construction of a multistory building on Plot No. C-1/5, measuring 871 square yards. The dispute originated when a developer (Respondent No. 5) began constructing a Basement + Ground + 9-story (B+G+9) building on a smaller plot of 454.11 square yards. The petitioners, as neighboring residents, challenged this, arguing that the area was designated for residential use only. The developer later expanded the plot to 662.55 square yards and proposed a B+G+14-story building. A stay order was issued by the court, but allegations of continued construction led to a contempt application. Subsequently, a new developer (Respondent No. 6) acquired four townhouses, combining them into an 871-square-yard plot through amalgamation, which the petitioners also contested. The core issue revolves around whether the plot’s land use was legally converted from commercial to residential, the validity of the plot amalgamation, and whether the construction violates the original lease conditions.
Petitioners’ Claims
The petitioners sought several declarations from the court:
1. Illegality of the Building Plan: They argued that the approval of the building plan by the Sindh Building Control Authority (SBCA) on March 17, 2017, for a B+G+9 structure, and its restoration on September 6, 2018, were illegal, unlawful, and contrary to the Karachi Building and Town Planning Regulations (KBTPR) 2002, the lease conditions, and other laws.
2. Restriction on Construction: The petitioners contended that the original lease from 1976 restricts construction on the plot to Ground + 2 floors, as stipulated in Clause 7, and that the plot must be used exclusively for residential bungalows, per Clauses 5 and 7 of the lease.
3. Illegality of Plot Amalgamation: The amalgamation of four plots (C-1/2, C-1/3, C-1/4, and C-1/5) into a single 871-square-yard plot, approved by the Sindh Master Plan Authority on October 28, 2020, was deemed illegal and in violation of KBTPR 2002.
4. Residential Status of the Plot: The petitioners claimed that the plot’s land use was legally converted from commercial to residential in 1984 when the Karachi Building Control Authority (KBCA) issued a No Objection Certificate (NOC) for residential townhouses. They argued that this conversion created a “legitimate expectation” among residents that the area would remain residential, a status upheld for decades by all parties, including official authorities.
The petitioners’ counsel argued that the KBCA’s 1984 NOC was sufficient to convert the land use, as no specific law governed such conversions at the time. They further contended that reversing the land use back to commercial without inviting public objections, as required by KBTPR 2002, was illegal. The principle of promissory estoppel, they argued, prevents authorities like the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMC) and SBCA from altering the land use, as residents relied on its residential status when purchasing their properties. The counsel cited Article 4(b) of the Constitution, which protects individuals from being hindered in lawful actions, and emphasized that the proposed high-rise would strain civic amenities like water, sewerage, and roads, causing nuisance and violating residents’ rights. They also noted that the Sindh Environmental Protection Agency Regulations 2014 mandate an Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) for such projects, which the developer failed to obtain.
Respondents’ Counterarguments
The respondents, particularly Respondent No. 6 (the current owner) and Respondent No. 5 (the initial developer), robustly defended the legality of their actions. Respondent No. 6’s counsel argued that the plot was always commercial, as per the original 1976 lease, and that the KMC had legally amended the lease to allow high-rise construction. They presented NOCs from the SBCA and KMC, dated between December 2016 and May 2017, approving the B+G+14 building. They refuted the claim of a 1984 conversion to residential use, asserting that the plot’s commercial status remained unchanged. The amalgamation of the four plots was also deemed legal, supported by the Sindh Master Plan Authority’s approval on October 28, 2020.
The respondents accused the petitioners of bad faith, alleging they used forged documents to obtain a restraining order and employed delaying tactics to harass the developers. They argued that the petitioners’ claims were contradictory and unsupported by evidence. The KMC and SBCA filed affidavits supporting the respondents, confirming the validity of all approvals. The respondents further contended that halting development was not a solution to Karachi’s growing infrastructure needs and that vertical development was necessary. They urged the court to dismiss the petition as an abuse of the legal process under Article 199.
The Assistant Advocate General and KMC’s counsel aligned with the respondents, stating that land use and amalgamation fall under the Sindh Master Plan Authority’s jurisdiction, and the petitioners had the right to appeal these decisions through appropriate channels. The KBCA also denied any violations, affirming that all necessary approvals were granted.
Court’s Reasoning and Decision
Justice Muhammad Karim Khan Agha dismissed the petition as not maintainable under Article 199 of the Constitution, which governs the High Court’s constitutional jurisdiction. The court identified the core issue as whether the petition could be adjudicated under Article 199, which is limited to cases of clear illegal government action or where no alternative remedies exist. The petitioners sought a writ of certiorari to quash the approvals from the KMC, SBCA, and Sindh Master Plan Authority, but the court found the dispute too fact-heavy and complex for constitutional jurisdiction.
The court noted that the petitioners and respondents presented conflicting claims about the plot’s land use, the validity of the amalgamation, and the building approvals. The petitioners argued that the land was converted to residential in 1984, while the respondents maintained it remained commercial, supported by official approvals. The court highlighted that resolving these disputes required a detailed examination of evidence, including the authenticity of documents, which is beyond the scope of Article 199. Citing precedents like Pakistan WAPDA Employees Pegham Union v. Member National Industrial Relations Commission(2014 SCMR 1676) and Lahore Cantonment Cooperative Housing Society Limited (PLD 2002 SC 1068), the court emphasized that factual disputes cannot be resolved in constitutional jurisdiction when alternative legal remedies, such as civil court proceedings, are available.
The court acknowledged that the KMC, SBCA, and Sindh Master Plan Authority have the authority to decide on land use and amalgamation under KBTPR 2002, but the conflicting positions of the parties necessitated a civil court’s intervention to evaluate evidence thoroughly. The court refrained from ruling on the merits of the case, dismissing the petition and all related applications due to the need for factual adjudication.
Implications for Residents and Developers
This case highlights the challenges of balancing urban development with residents’ rights to preserve their neighborhood’s character. The petitioners’ concerns about infrastructure strain and environmental impacts reflect broader issues in rapidly growing cities like Karachi. However, the court’s dismissal underscores the importance of pursuing such disputes through appropriate legal channels, such as civil courts, where evidence can be rigorously examined. For developers, the case emphasizes the need for transparent compliance with zoning and environmental regulations to avoid legal challenges.
Conclusion
The dismissal of the petition in the Gulshan-e-Faisal case illustrates the limitations of constitutional jurisdiction in resolving complex land use disputes. Residents seeking to protect their neighborhood must provide undisputed evidence of legal violations or exhaust alternative remedies before invoking Article 199. Meanwhile, developers must ensure compliance with all regulatory requirements, including public consultation and environmental assess
ments, to avoid protracted legal battles. This case serves as a reminder of the importance of clear zoning laws and robust legal processes in urban planning
Imagine your father passes away, leaving behind a lifetime of hard work — property, businesses, perhaps even investments. You are a rightful heir, but here’s the catch: no one tells you what he owned. The tax records — which could reveal everything — are locked away behind legal walls. And when you ask for them, the tax authorities say, No. Section 216 of the Income Tax Ordinance doesn’t allow it.”
This isn’t just a story. It’s a real legal battle — and it changed how inheritance and tax privacy interact in Pakistan. The case of Sadia Ishfaq v. Chief Commissioner (2024 PTD 869) decided by Lahore High Court has become a landmark judgment for legal heirs trying to access tax information of their deceased parents.
Let’s break it down clearly — what happened, what the court ruled, and why this decision matters for anyone dealing with inheritance law in Pakistan.
Case Summary: The Background of the Dispute
The petitioner, Mst. Sadia Ishfaq, was the daughter of Haji Ghulam Rasool (deceased). After her father’s passing, she wanted to ascertain the extent of his assets to claim her rightful share under Islamic inheritance law.
She approached the Commissioner Inland Revenue to obtain copies of her father’s income tax returns. Her reasoning was straightforward: the tax record would reveal what properties, businesses, and assets her father had declared.
But the Commissioner rejected her request.
Their argument? Section 216(1) and 216(3)(m) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 restrict disclosure of a taxpayer’s information. The FBR maintained that if she wanted the tax records, she would have to file a civil suit, and the information could then be produced as evidence in court.
Sadia Ishfaq challenged this rejection through a writ petition before the Lahore High Court.
The Legal Issue: Does Section 216 Block Legal Heirs from Accessing Tax Information?
Section 216 of the Ordinance imposes strict confidentiality on tax records. But the real question was:
Does this confidentiality extend even to legal heirs of a deceased taxpayer?
Can a daughter be denied access to her own father’s tax returns?
The Commissioner relied on Section 216(3)(m), which provides an exception to disclosure if there are civil court proceedings involving the tax department. But there was no active civil suit — Sadia was trying to get information to prepare for one.
The case essentially pitted taxpayer confidentiality against inheritance rights.
Authoritative Ruling by the Lahore High Court
Justice Shams Mehmood Mirza delivered a clear and impactful judgment:
> “Section 216 of the Income Tax Ordinance does not place any bar on legal representatives of a deceased taxpayer from obtaining the copies of his/her tax returns.”
The Court set aside the impugned order of the Commissioner and directed the tax department to provide Sadia Ishfaq with all necessary tax returns of her late father.
Key Extract from the Judgment:
Section 216(3)(m) did not justify withholding the information.
A legal heir cannot file a civil suit blindly without knowing what property exists.
Legal heirs are natural representatives of the deceased for tax and inheritance matters.
Tax privacy laws cannot override the rights of legal heirs to access information essential for asserting their lawful inheritance.
This was a decisive win for inheritance rights.
Legal Insight: Why This Case Matters
This judgment bridges a crucial gap between tax confidentiality and inheritance rights.
Tax authorities often treat Section 216 as an absolute wall of secrecy. But the Court clarified that this wall does not stand between a parent and their legal heirs.
What This Means in Practice:
If your parent or spouse was a taxpayer, you have the right to request their tax records after their death.
You do not need to file a civil suit first just to obtain basic information.
Tax departments must cooperate with legal representatives when inheritance rights are involved.
Section 216 must be interpreted in harmony with Islamic inheritance principles.
This case is likely to be cited in future disputes involving FBR, inheritance litigation, and property disclosure issues.
Understanding Section 216 — in Plain Words
Many people hear “Section 216” and assume it’s untouchable. Here’s what it actually says:
216(1) — Tax officers cannot disclose taxpayer information to anyone without lawful authority.
216(3)(m) — This restriction does not apply when there are proceedings in civil court involving the FBR or tax matters.
But the High Court pointed out that the section doesn’t prohibit legal heirs from getting tax information of a deceased taxpayer.
Inheritance law is not a “third-party snooping” scenario — it’s about legal successors continuing legal and financial matters of the deceased.
Practical Implications for Legal Heirs in Pakistan
This ruling gives legal heirs a stronger legal footing when dealing with FBR or other tax authorities.
1. Faster Estate Settlement
Instead of wasting months in procedural delays, legal heirs can directly apply for tax returns and move toward settlement of property and inheritance distribution.
2. Protection from Fraud
If one sibling or family member tries to conceal property, tax records can reveal true declared assets, preventing unjust claims.
3. Ease in Filing Inheritance Suits
Lawyers can draft precise claims in civil court once tax records confirm what assets exist — saving time and avoiding vague pleadings.
4. Stronger Rights for Women Heirs
This case especially benefits daughters and widows, who often face information asymmetry in inheritance disputes. Access to tax records gives them leverage and transparency.
Step-by-Step: How Legal Heirs Can Request Tax Information
If you’re a legal heir facing a similar situation, here’s a practical roadmap:
1. Obtain a death certificate of the deceased taxpayer.
2. Prepare legal heirship documents (e.g., succession certificate or family registration certificate).
3. Submit a formal application to the relevant Commissioner Inland Revenue requesting copies of tax returns of the deceased.
4. Cite the case Sadia Ishfaq v. Chief Commissioner (2024 PTD 869) in your application.
5. If the department refuses — file a writ petition before the High Court.
This process is much faster and cleaner than initiating blind civil litigation.
Case Law in Context
This decision builds upon earlier principles from C.I.T. v. Gul Cooking Oil and Vegetable Ghee (Pvt.) Ltd. (2008 PTD 169), which clarified exceptions to Section 216.
However, Sadia Ishfaq goes a step further — it explicitly affirms that legal heirs are not “outsiders” under Section 216.
Practical Takeaway for Lawyers
For lawyers handling inheritance law in Pakistan, this ruling is a powerful precedent.
It can expedite property distribution in estate cases.
It provides a legal pathway for disclosure without long procedural fights.
It offers a solid ground for writ petitions challenging arbitrary refusals by tax authorities.
This is also a reminder for tax authorities that secrecy is not absolute when Islamic inheritance law is in play.
FAQs: Inheritance & Tax Information in Pakistan
1. Can legal heirs request the tax returns of a deceased person?
Yes. As clarified in Sadia Ishfaq v. Chief Commissioner (2024 PTD 869), Section 216 of the Income Tax Ordinance does not bar legal heirs from obtaining such information.
2. Do I need a court case before requesting tax records?
No. Legal heirs can request tax returns directly from FBR. If the request is denied, they can file a writ petition in the High Court.
3. What documents are required to prove I’m a legal heir?
Death certificate, CNIC copies, family registration certificate, and/or succession certificate.
4. What if other heirs object to me obtaining the tax records?
Tax records are public for legal heirs. Their objection does not affect your right to information.
5. Does this apply to all taxpayers, including business owners?
Yes. Whether the deceased was a salaried individual, business owner, or landlord — the principle is the same.
6. Can I use these records in court for inheritance claims?
Yes. Tax records are admissible evidence to establish declared assets.
Conclusion: A Precedent for Transparency and Justice
The judgment in Sadia Ishfaq v. Chief Commissioner (2024 PTD 869) is more than a legal victory — it’s a step toward transparency in inheritance matters.
For too long, many heirs — especially women — were left in the dark, unable to access critical information about family assets. Section 216 was used as a shield of secrecy.
The Lahore High Court has now made it clear:
Tax privacy ends where inheritance rights begin.
Legal heirs have a right to know.
The state must facilitate, not frustrate, that right.
This precedent will help countless families settle estates fairly, avoid unnecessary litigation, and uphold the principles of justice and transparency in Pakistan.
Further Reading & Legal Help
Disclaimer: This article is for general legal awareness and does not constitute legal advice. For case-specific guidance, please consult a qualified lawyer.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Q1: Can FBR recover full tax while my appeal is pending?
A: No. Under Section 140(1), FBR can’t recover more than 10% of the assessed amount during the pendency of an appeal under Section 127.
Q2: What if FBR hasn’t asked me to deposit 10% yet?
A: Then they can’t recover anything beyond issuing a proper notice. You should offer to deposit 10% if required, and challenge any illegal recovery.
Q3: What should I do if FBR deducts full tax from my bank account?
A: You can file a constitutional petition in the High Court. As this case shows, the court can order reimbursement of the unlawfully recovered amount.
Q4: Does this protection apply only to companies?
A: No. It applies to all taxpayers —individuals, partnerships, and companies—who have filed valid appeals under Section 127.
Q5: Can FBR recover the balance after my appeal is dismissed?
A: Yes. Once the appeal is decided and liability is confirmed, FBR can legally recover the full balance amount.
Q6: What happens if I don’t file an appeal at all?
A: Then FBR is free to proceed with full recovery under Section 140, since no appellate protection applies.
Final Takeaway
The Lahore High Court’s decision in Messrs Radiant Medical (Pvt.) Limited v. FBR is a landmark in taxpayer protection. It draws a clear boundary around the FBR’s recovery powers during the appeal process.
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In a significant ruling by the High Court of Sindh at Sukkur, a batch of constitutional petitions (C.P. No. D-1053 of 2025 and connected matters) has shed light on the balance between governmental regulation of business activities and the fundamental rights of citizens, particularly in the context of dairy farming and urban planning. Decided by Justices Muhammad Saleem Jessar and Nisar Ahmed Bhanbhro, this case revolves around the cancellation of provisional allotments of cattle pens (pans) in the Cattle Colony Sukkur. The judgment not only restores allotments for several petitioners but also reinforces constitutional protections under Articles 4, 9, 14, 18, 23, and 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan, emphasizing freedom of trade, equality before the law, and women's independent right to engage in business.
Background of the Dispute
The Cattle Colony Sukkur was established by the Government of Sindh on approximately 90 acres of land to relocate cattle sheds from urban areas of Sukkur city. This initiative stemmed from earlier judicial directives in C.P. No. D-99 of 2008, where the High Court repeatedly ordered authorities to make Sukkur a "cattle-free city" to address issues like traffic congestion, road cleanliness, and public health hazards caused by stray animals. The colony features 205 plots divided into four categories: A (11 plots, 22,000 sq ft or more), B (64 plots, 14,000-20,000 sq ft), C (75 plots, 9,500-14,000 sq ft), and D (55 plots, 2,500-9,500 sq ft).
Provisional allotments were made in 2023 to individuals engaged in dairy business, with the condition that they establish cattle pens and shift their operations from the city. However, in June 2025, the Administrator of the Cattle Colony (also the Assistant Commissioner Sukkur) issued orders canceling 35 allotments. Reasons included failure to establish pens, allotments to husbands and wives (deemed as family duplications), non-association with dairy business, and in some cases, misuse like constructing residential houses. A Scrutiny Committee, formed via a notification dated April 11, 2025, conducted physical verifications and recommended these cancellations after issuing show-cause notices and hearings.
The petitioners, including dairy farmers and women entrepreneurs, challenged these orders, arguing that the cancellations were arbitrary, violated their right to business, and discriminated against women. They claimed peaceful possession since allotment and highlighted inadequate facilities in the colony as a reason for delays in shifting animals.
Arguments Presented
Counsel for the petitioners contended that the allotments were canceled without cogent reasons, infringing on their fundamental right to conduct lawful business under Article 18. They emphasized that the petitioners had been in the dairy trade for years, operating sheds in Sukkur city, and that the colony was meant to facilitate relocation. For female petitioners, cancellations based on their husbands' allotments were labeled discriminatory, as these women operated independently. Photographs of established pens were submitted to prove compliance, and the lack of prior policy or terms for cancellation was highlighted as a procedural flaw.
The Additional Advocate General defended the actions, stating that allotments were conditional on establishing pens and shifting operations, which many petitioners failed to do. He argued that the right to business is not absolute and can be regulated by the government, including through licensing or restrictions for public interest. Show-cause notices ensured due process, and fresh allotments were initiated for genuine applicants. The petitions were deemed non-maintainable, as no illegality was apparent.
Court's Analysis and Ruling
After reviewing records, arguments, and precedents, the Court disposed of the petitions with nuanced directives. It acknowledged the government's authority to regulate trade under Article 18, which allows reasonable restrictions like licensing systems or public interest regulations. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Administrator, Market Committee, Kasur v. Muhammad Sharif (1994 SCMR 1048), the judges noted that while citizens have a right to lawful business, it does not confer uncontrolled privileges, and regulations for orderly commerce are permissible.
However, the Court found flaws in the cancellations. Notably, no formal policy or terms were framed at the time of initial allotments in 2023, making it unfair to impose penal consequences for non-utilization without clear guidelines. The petitioners demonstrated interest in compliance, and with vacant plots available, outright cancellation was deemed excessive. The Court stressed that denying allotments would hinder the goal of a cattle-free Sukkur, as petitioners might continue urban operations, violating earlier judicial orders.
A key highlight was the protection of women's rights. For female petitioners like Fozia Mahar, Samina Naz Abbasi, and Nida, cancellations based on spousal allotments were struck down as unjustified and discriminatory. The judgment eloquently stated that women are independent rights-holders under the Constitution, not dependent on marital status. Linking economic rights to relationships reflects a "regressive and untenable conception" incompatible with Islamic law, constitutional equality (Article 25), and protections for life, dignity, and property (Articles 9, 14, 23). Financial independence for women fosters family harmony and societal progress, the Court observed.
Specific dispositions included:
- Restoration of original plots where unallotted, or alternatives in the same category.
- For petitioners whose plots were re-allotted to non-parties, fresh equivalent plots were ordered.
- Dismissals for misuse (e.g., residential construction) or non-association with dairy (e.g., a lawyer petitioner).
- One petitioner was granted possession of his allotted plot.
- Directives to implement the 2008 order for a cattle-free Sukkur, with a six-month timeline for new allottees to establish pens, and cooperation from local authorities and police.
The Court directed compliance within timelines, warning of penal consequences for defiance, and ordered copies sent to respondents.
Implications for Legal Knowledge
This judgment underscores the judiciary's role in balancing regulatory powers with fundamental rights. It clarifies that while Article 18 permits government oversight of trades like dairy farming—especially for urban planning and public welfare—such actions must be reasonable, non-arbitrary, and grounded in policy. The absence of predefined terms invalidated harsh penalties here, serving as a reminder for authorities to establish clear frameworks before allotting public resources.
On gender equality, the ruling advances progressive jurisprudence by affirming women's autonomous economic rights. It aligns with constitutional mandates and international norms, discouraging patriarchal assumptions in administrative decisions. For businesses, it highlights that provisional allotments imply obligations, but due process and opportunities for compliance are essential.
In broader terms, this case illustrates how environmental and urban policies intersect with livelihoods. Relocating industries like dairy farming requires supportive infrastructure; otherwise, enforcement risks violating rights to livelihood (Article 9) and business (Article 18). Citizens facing similar cancellations should document compliance and seek judicial review promptly.
This decision promotes transparency in public administration, urging committees like the Scrutiny Committee to act without bias. It also reinforces that judicial interventions can harmonize public goals with individual rights, ensuring equitable outcomes.
For legal practitioners and the public, this case exemplifies how constitutional petitions can challenge executive overreach. It encourages proactive engagement with authorities to resolve disputes before escalation.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
1. What was the main reason for the cancellation of cattle pen allotments in the Cattle Colony Sukkur?
The cancellations were primarily due to failure to establish cattle pens, allotments to both husbands and wives (seen as duplications), non-association with dairy business, and misuse of plots (e.g., for residential purposes). A Scrutiny Committee verified these issues after physical inspections and recommended actions following show-cause notices.
2. Did the Court uphold the right of women to independent business in this case?
Yes, the Court strongly affirmed women's independent right to engage in business under Articles 18 and 25 of the Constitution. It ruled that canceling allotments solely because a woman's husband had a plot was discriminatory and unjustified, emphasizing that women's economic rights are not linked to marital status and promote financial independence.
3. Under what conditions can the government cancel provisional allotments like these?
The government can regulate business under Article 18 through reasonable restrictions, such as licensing or compliance requirements. However, the Court held that cancellations must be based on pre-existing policy or terms; in this case, the absence of such rules made outright cancellations unfair, especially with vacant plots available for alternatives.
4. What directives did the Court issue to make Sukkur a cattle-free city?
The Court reiterated orders from C.P. No. D-99 of 2008, directing authorities to relocate cattle farms outside the city within timelines. New allottees must establish pens within six months, with potential cancellation for non-compliance. Local government, police, and administration must cooperate to prevent stray animals and ensure cleanliness.
5. Were all petitioners successful in getting their allotments restored?
No, most were granted restoration or alternatives, but some petitions were dismissed—for instance, where a petitioner built a residential house or was not linked to dairy business (e.g., a lawyer). The Court prioritized fairness, avoiding adverse actions against new allottees not party to the proceedings by providing equivalents.
Introduction
In March 2024, the Sindh High Court handed down an important judgment in the case of Indus Valley School of Arts & Architecture v. Government of Sindh & Others (SBLR 2025 Sindh 976).
At first glance, it looks like a technical dispute between a well-known educational institution and the Sindh Building Control Authority (SBCA) over construction permissions. But when you dig deeper, it highlights key issues in Pakistan’s urban planning laws, regulatory inconsistencies, and how courts interpret Floor Area Ratio (FAR) rules under the Karachi Building & Town Planning Regulations (KB\&TPR).
This case is significant not only for architects, developers, and educational institutions, but also for lawyers, planners, and citizens who wish to understand how building regulations evolve — and how mistakes in interpretation can cost years of delay.
Let’s break it down.
The Background of the Case
The Indus Valley School of Arts & Architecture (IVS), established under the Indus Valley School of Art and Architecture Act, 1994, owns a large parcel of land in Clifton, Karachi, allotted by the Karachi Development Authority (KDA) in 1991.
In 1993, the then Karachi Building Control Authority (KBCA) approved construction on the plot — Basement + Ground + 3 floors — under the KB\&TPR 1979, based on an FAR of 1:1.5.
The total covered area approved was 70,371.58 sq. ft., slightly less than the maximum permissible 74,250 sq. ft.
In 2015, a Completion Certificate was issued by SBCA, enhancing the covered area to 84,443.62 sq. ft., on the condition that no further construction would be allowed.
Later, IVS sought to make alterations/revisions to expand the built-up area further, relying on the updated KB\&TPR 2002, which allowed FAR of 1:1.6. This meant they could, in theory, construct up to 281,486.34 sq. ft. — far more than they currently had.
But when IVS applied for permission, the SBCA rejected the request through its order dated 17 September 2021.
Why Did SBCA Reject the Application?
SBCA argued that:
The building had originally been approved under KB\&TPR 1979.
Since it had already been “regularised” in 2015 through the Completion Certificate, no further alteration/revision could be considered.
Clause 3-2.20(d) of KB\&TPR 2002 prohibits further regularisation or addition/alteration for buildings sanctioned under 1979 Regulations (except residential plots under 399 sq. yards or amenity plots under strict conditions).
In short, SBCA treated the 2015 approval as a final regularisation, meaning the chapter was closed.
The Legal Question
The central question before the Court was:
Can a building originally sanctioned under KB\&TPR 1979 be considered for alteration/revision under KB\&TPR 2002, especially when the property is an amenity plot?
Or in simpler terms — was SBCA correct in blocking IVS’s expansion based on a strict reading of its own regulations?
The Court’s Findings
The Sindh High Court, through Justice Mohammad Abdur Rahman, carefully examined:
1. Section 6 of Sindh Building Control Ordinance (SBCO) 1979 – No building can be constructed without SBCA’s approval in line with prescribed rules and regulations.
2. Regulation 1-5 of KB\&TPR 2002 – The 2002 Regulations supersede the 1979 Regulations. All approvals under 1979 are deemed to have been made under 2002.
3. Regulation 3-2.20(d) of KB\&TPR 2002 – Generally bars further regularisation/alteration of buildings approved under 1979 Regulations, but explicitly exempts amenity plots.
4. Nature of IVS’s property – The Court noted that IVS’s land is an amenity plot, falling squarely under the exemption.
Based on this, the Court concluded:
The Completion Certificate of 2015 was not a “regularisation” but rather an approval within permissible FAR under 2002 Regulations.
SBCA misapplied Regulation 3-2.20(d) by ignoring the amenity-plot exemption.
The rejection order was therefore illegal and unsustainable.
The Judgment
The Court allowed the petition, holding that:
1. The SBCA’s rejection order dated 17 September 2021 is set aside.
2. The Director General, SBCA, must personally consider IVS’s application under Regulation 3-2.4 of KB\&TPR 2002.
3. The application is to be treated as an alteration/revision, not as a regularisation.
4. A decision must be given within two weeks of submission.
No costs were awarded.
Why This Case Matters
This case highlights several important lessons for law and practice:
1. Supersession of Laws – When new regulations replace old ones, approvals under the old law are often deemed to fall under the new framework. Authorities cannot “freeze” rights under outdated rules.
2. Amenity Plot Exception – The Court reaffirmed that amenity plots (land reserved for public/educational/health institutions) enjoy special treatment in building laws.
3. Misinterpretation by Regulators – SBCA wrongly interpreted its own regulations, showing how administrative overreach can stifle lawful development.
4. Judicial Oversight – Courts play a crucial role in ensuring regulatory authorities act fairly, consistently, and within their lawful powers.
Broader Implications
For Educational Institutions: They often hold amenity plots and face hurdles in expansion. This case strengthens their right to seek alterations under 2002 Regulations.
For Developers and Architects: It clarifies how FAR rules under KB\&TPR 2002 should be applied.
For Urban Planning: The judgment emphasizes clarity and fairness in regulating Karachi’s fast-changing skyline.
For Lawyers and Students: It’s a classic example of statutory interpretation — how to read overlapping laws, repeals, and exemptions.
Conclusion
The Indus Valley School of Arts case is more than just a dispute over square footage. It’s a reminder that:
Laws evolve, and regulators must apply the current framework correctly.
Special categories like amenity plots cannot be treated as ordinary commercial properties.
Citizens and institutions must be vigilant in asserting their rights when authorities misinterpret regulations.
For law students, it’s a textbook example of constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199, administrative law principles, and the relationship between old and new regulations.
For the public, it’s a practical lesson: always know the limits of your property rights, the scope of regulations, and never accept a wrongful rejection without legal challenge.
The case stands as a significant precedent for balancing urban growth with regulatory fairness in Sindh.
FAQs from Indus Valley School of Arts v. Govt. of Sindh (2025)
Q1: What was the dispute in this case?
The Indus Valley School of Arts wanted to expand its campus by using the higher Floor Area Ratio (FAR) allowed under the 2002 Regulations. But the Sindh Building Control Authority (SBCA) rejected their request, saying they had already used more space than allowed under the old 1979 rules.
Q2: Why did SBCA say “no” to the School’s application?
SBCA argued that once a building plan approved under 1979 Regulations had been “regularized” or given a completion certificate, no further alteration or addition could be allowed under the 2002 Regulations—except in small cases like houses on 399 sq. yards.
Q3: How did the School defend its case?
The School said:
Their 2015 completion certificate was issued under 2002 Regulations, not 1979.
Even if 1979 applied, their land is an amenity plot (educational use), which is an exception.
Under Regulation 1-5 of 2002, all old approvals are treated as if they were given under 2002 anyway.
Q4: What did the High Court finally decide?
The Court agreed with the School. It said SBCA misapplied the law. Since the land was an amenity plot and approvals fell under the 2002 framework, the application should be treated as an alteration, not a “regularization.” The SBCA was ordered to reconsider the plan within two weeks.
Q5: What’s the key takeaway for the public?
In building law, technical words matter. Calling something an “alteration” instead of a “regularization” can change the entire outcome. For institutions or property owners, always check which regulations apply—old or new—because this can open or close the door to future construction rights.
Bottom line: In property and construction law, timing + terminology = your rights. Misunderstanding either can cost millions.
Introduction
Consent decrees occupy a unique place in civil procedure. On one hand, they carry the seal of the court and are enforceable as judicial orders. On the other hand, their foundation is essentially contractual—they reflect nothing more than the agreement of the parties who choose to settle their disputes through compromise.
But what happens when such a decree attempts to bind a party that never consented? Can a regulator, a housing authority, or any third party be forced to comply with a private arrangement it never signed? These questions were addressed by the Sindh High Court in the case of Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority (DHA) v. Province of Sindh and Others, reported as 2025 CLC 1237.
This case not only clarifies the scope of consent decrees under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 but also reinforces the constitutional duty of lower courts to follow binding precedents under Article 201 of the Constitution of Pakistan.
Factual Background
The dispute arose out of property located within Karachi’s Defence Housing Authority. Two private parties had filed a civil suit in 1996, and during its pendency, they entered into a compromise. Based on their settlement, the suit was decreed on 17 June 2006.
However, DHA itself was not a signatory to this compromise. In its written statement, DHA had specifically objected to the ownership claims of the supposed seller. Despite this, the decree was passed, and in subsequent execution proceedings, DHA was directed to transfer the property in the name of one of the private respondents.
DHA challenged these proceedings through a Constitution Petition (No. D-4022 of 2024) before the Sindh High Court. The core question was straightforward yet significant:
Can DHA be compelled to transfer property based on a compromise decree to which it was not a consenting party?
Legal Issues
The case turned on two main legal points:
1. Nature and scope of consent decrees under Order XXIII, Rule 3, CPC.
2. Effect of High Court precedents and the binding force of such judgments on subordinate courts under Article 201 of the Constitution.
Court’s Analysis
1. Consent Decree as a Contract
The Court reaffirmed the settled principle: a consent decree is essentially a contract between parties, endorsed by the court. While it has the force of a judicial order, its binding effect is confined only to those who consented to it.
Thus, if a party has not signed the compromise or given its consent, the decree cannot be enforced against them. The Court relied on earlier decisions, including Abdul Hafeez v. Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority (PTD 2015 Sindh 336), where DHA had faced an identical issue and was held not bound by a private compromise.
2. Role of Written Statements and Admissions
The respondents argued that DHA’s written statement contained concessions amounting to an admission. The Court rejected this argument. It clarified that if a plaintiff believes the defendant has made admissions, the proper procedure is to seek judgment on admissions under Order XII, Rule 6, CPC. But in this case, DHA had raised objections rather than admissions, so this route was unavailable.
3. Duty of Courts in Passing Consent Decrees
The Court emphasized that when a compromise is presented, the trial court must carefully examine its scope. Specifically:
If a defendant is not a party to the compromise, the suit against them must either continue or be dismissed.
Under no circumstances can a decree be passed against a non-signatory defendant.
The courts below failed to appreciate this distinction, and even the executing court compelled DHA to act contrary to law.
4. Article 201 – Binding Precedent
Perhaps the most important aspect of this case is the Court’s admonition to subordinate courts. Article 201 of the Constitution makes it mandatory for lower courts to follow the binding decisions of the High Court. The Court observed that had the trial and executing courts paid attention to existing precedents, this unnecessary litigation could have been avoided.
Copies of the judgment were directed to be circulated to judicial officers as guidance.
Key Takeaways
From this decision, several important legal principles emerge:
1. Consent decrees are contractual in nature. They bind only those who sign them, not regulators or third parties.
2. Non-signatory defendants cannot be compelled. Courts must dismiss suits against them or allow proceedings to continue, but cannot pass decrees against them.
3. Admissions must be handled under proper procedure. If a written statement contains concessions, relief can only be granted through Order XII, Rule 6 CPC, not by treating it as consent.
4. Binding precedents matter. Article 201 ensures uniformity and prevents repetitive litigation, but only if subordinate courts follow them diligently.
5. Fraud and misrepresentation undermine decrees. Even a consent decree can be challenged if obtained through fraud, mistake, or misrepresentation.
Academic Significance
This case underscores the delicate balance between judicial authority and contractual freedom. While courts encourage settlement and compromise, the judicial process cannot be used to impose private bargains on outsiders. The judgment also reflects broader constitutional concerns: ensuring consistency in judicial practice and safeguarding regulators from fraudulent or collusive decrees.
For law students and practitioners, the case is a practical reminder to:
Always distinguish between parties who signed a compromise and those who did not.
Understand that a decree is not automatically binding on everyone named in a suit.
Recognize that Article 201 is more than a procedural formality; it is essential for judicial discipline.
Conclusion
The Sindh High Court’s ruling in Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority v. Province of Sindh (2025 CLC 1237) is a reaffirmation of fundamental principles of civil law. Consent decrees cannot be used as shortcuts to bypass legal procedures or to coerce regulators into executing dubious transfers.
For property buyers, the message is clear: verify ownership, scrutinize title documents, and ensure that housing authorities are part of any compromise if their role is essential. For courts, the reminder is equally important: follow binding precedents, respect the limits of consent decrees, and avoid burdening higher courts with avoidable disputes.
In the end, the judgment protects not just DHA but the integrity of the judicial process itself—ensuring that compromise remains a tool for genuine settlement, not a weapon for exploitation.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
1. What exactly is a consent decree?
A consent decree is basically a settlement agreement between the parties in a civil suit, which is then endorsed by the court. Although it looks like a judicial order, its foundation is contractual. That means it only binds those who agreed to it — not outsiders.
2. Can a housing authority (like DHA) be forced to act on a consent decree it never signed?
No. The Sindh High Court clarified that a housing authority or any third party cannot be compelled to implement a compromise decree unless it was a consenting party. If they were not signatories, the decree has no legal effect against them.
3. What happens if one party claims the other admitted something in their written statement?
If a party believes there is an admission in the opponent’s written statement, the proper step is to apply under Order XII, Rule 6 CPC (Judgment on Admissions). But such admissions must be clear and unambiguous. In this case, DHA had raised objections instead of admissions, so that argument failed.
4. Can a consent decree be challenged?
Yes. Even a consent decree can be questioned if it was obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake. Courts are empowered to set it aside in such situations because fraud vitiates even the most solemn agreements.
5. Why did the High Court criticize the lower courts in this case?
Because the lower courts ignored binding precedents. Under Article 201 of the Constitution, all subordinate courts are legally bound to follow High Court decisions. The High Court observed that if those precedents had been followed, years of unnecessary litigation could have been avoided.
Introduction
Rent disputes are among the most common issues in civil courts, especially in urban centers like Rawalpindi, Lahore, and Karachi. While tenancy laws aim to balance the rights of landlords and tenants, real problems often arise when rent agreements expire, new contracts are made with family members, or when tenants fail to comply with court orders.
The Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench) in Asif Zahoor v. Muhammad Hanif (2025 CLC 1268) recently clarified these issues in detail. Justice Mirza Viqas Rauf delivered the judgment on 7th April 2025, dismissing the tenant’s appeal and reinforcing two fundamental principles of rent law:
1. Once you are in possession and paying rent, you remain a tenant—even if the agreement later shifts to your spouse’s name.
2. Failure to comply with a tentative rent order is fatal—your defense can be struck off, and eviction ordered without further trial.
Let’s break down the case and its legal significanc
The Background
The landlord, Muhammad Hanif, filed an ejectment application under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963. His grounds were:
The tenant, Asif Zahoor, had defaulted on rent payments.
He required the property for his own bona fide personal use.
Originally, Asif had entered into a tenancy agreement with Muhammad Hanif on 15 May 2018. When it expired, a .fresh agreement was executed in March 2020 between the landlord and Asif’s wife, effective until 2025.
At this point, Asif argued that he was no longer the tenant since the agreement was now with his wife. He claimed he had been wrongly impleaded in the eviction proceedings.
The Courtroom Twist
During proceedings, the Additional Rent Controller (ARC) passed a tentative rent order on 22 September 2023, directing Asif to deposit arrears and continue depositing monthly rent.
However, Asif failed to comply.
The landlord then moved an application under Section 17(9) of the Act, 1963, which provides that if a tenant fails to comply with a tentative rent order, his defense is struck off, and eviction follows automatically.
The ARC agreed and, on 11 December 2023, struck off Asif’s defense and ordered him to vacate the premises within 30 days.
Asif appealed to the High Court.
The Legal Questions
The High Court had to decide:
1. Was Asif still a tenant despite the new tenancy agreement being in his wife’s name?
2. Could the eviction order stand if he had failed to comply with the tentative rent order?
Definition of a Tenant under Law
Section 20(j) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963 defines a tenant as:
Any person who undertakes or is bound to pay rent for possession or occupation of a building;
Any person who continues in possession even after expiry of tenancy;
The heirs or successors of a tenant who remain in possession after termination.
The Court emphasized that payment of rent and possession are key—not the name on the agreement.
Since Asif continued depositing rent even after the new agreement with his wife, he remained a tenant under the law. His denial of the relationship did not change this fact.
The Tentative Rent Order
Section 17(8) of the Act requires the tenant, at the first hearing, to deposit all arrears and continue paying rent until the case is decided.
Section 17(9) clearly states the consequences of non-compliance:
If the tenant fails to deposit rent as ordered, his defense will be struck off.
The landlord will be placed in possession without further proceedings.
This provision makes compliance with rent orders mandatory. Courts have consistently held that even a single lapse can cost the tenant his entire defense.
The Judgment
Justice Mirza Viqas Rauf upheld the ARC’s order, holding that:
Asif remained a tenant under the legal definition.
His failure to comply with the tentative rent order left the ARC with no choice but to strike off his defense.
The eviction order was legally justified and required no interference.
The High Court dismissed the appeal, confirming the tenant’s eviction.
Key Precedents Cited
The Court also referred to the Supreme Court’s rulings in:
Injum Aqeel v. Latif Muhammad Chaudhry (2023 SCMR 1361) – defining legal misconduct and moral misconduct.
Gerry’s International v. Aeroflot Russian Airlines (2018 SCMR 662) – emphasizing adherence to contractual and statutory obligations.
These judgments reinforced that rent laws must be applied strictly to prevent misuse by defaulting tenants.
Lessons for Landlords and Tenants
This case carries important takeaways:
For Landlords:
1. Always pursue eviction through proper legal channels under the Act.
2. Insist on a tentative rent order early in proceedings—it can secure rent and strengthen your case.
3. Even if tenants deny tenancy, evidence of rent payments can establish the relationship.
For Tenants:
1. Never ignore a tentative rent order—non-compliance is practically an eviction warrant.
2. Continuing in possession and paying rent keeps you legally a tenant, regardless of technical arguments.
3. Denying tenancy will not succeed if your own conduct (like rent deposits) proves otherwise.
Broader Legal Significance
The judgment clarifies two recurring disputes in tenancy law:
Shifting tenancy to family members: Even if a new contract is executed with a spouse, the original tenant’s possession and payment history keeps him bound as a tenant.
Strict compliance with rent orders: The law is unforgiving when it comes to default. Courts will not indulge tenants who fail to deposit rent on time.
This ensures fairness to landlords while reminding tenants of their obligations.
Conclusion
Asif Zahoor v. Muhammad Hanif (2025 CLC 1268) is a landmark decision on the scope of tenancy under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963. It demonstrates that:
Tenancy is based on possession and payment, not merely names on paper.
Compliance with court orders, especially tentative rent orders, is not optional—it is the lifeline of a tenant’s defense.
The case is a strong reminder that law favors the vigilant, not the negligent. Tenants must act responsibly, and landlords must act lawfully, to maintain balance in the delicate relationship of rent and possession.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on Asif Zahoor v. Muhammad Hanif (2025 CLC 1268)
1. If a tenancy agreement is signed with my spouse, does that mean I am no longer a tenant?
Not necessarily. Under the law, if you remain in possession of the property and continue paying rent, you are still considered a tenant. The court looks at conduct—possession and payment—not just the name on the agreement.
2. What is a “tentative rent order”?
It’s a court order requiring the tenant to deposit all arrears of rent and continue paying monthly rent during the proceedings. It ensures that the landlord is not deprived of rent while the case is being contested.
3. What happens if I don’t comply with a tentative rent order?
Failure to comply has serious consequences under Section 17(9) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963. The tenant’s defense is struck off, and the landlord gets immediate possession without further trial.
4. Can I deny being a tenant to avoid eviction?
Denying tenancy won’t work if your actions prove otherwise. If you stay in possession and keep depositing rent, the law will still treat you as a tenant—even if the agreement has expired or is in someone else’s name.
5. What are the main grounds on which a landlord can seek eviction of a tenant?
Under the Act, eviction may be sought for:
Default in payment of rent;
Personal bona fide need of the landlord;
Subletting without permission;
Expiry or termination of tenancy.
6. Can the court show leniency if I fail to deposit rent on time?
Generally no. The law is strict. Once a tenant defaults in complying with the tentative rent order, the Controller is bound to strike off the defense. Courts rarely excuse such defaults.
When it comes to property disputes in Karachi and Sindh, one issue crops up again and again: who owns the land, and where are the boundaries? Without clarity, property owners face encroachments, delays in lease renewals, and endless litigation.
A recent judgment of the Sindh High Court in Haji Muhammad Yousuf v. Province of Sindh (2025) sheds light on these recurring disputes. The Court dealt with a petition for land demarcation and lease renewal, but its ruling makes an important point: constitutional petitions are not the right forum for disputed titles and lease conversions.
Let’s break down the case, the ruling, and what it means for property owners in Pakistan.
Case Background
The petitioner, Haji Muhammad Yousuf, claimed allotment of 50 acres of land in Deh Kharkharo, Gadap Town, Karachi back in 1976. Initially, the land was given on a 10-year basis but was later converted into a 30-year lease in 1992.
Here’s the problem:
The petitioner wanted the lease extended to 99 years.
He also sought official demarcation of the land.
Meanwhile, land grabbers allegedly tried to interfere, relying on fabricated allotment orders.
A civil suit was already pending on the matter, where a status quo order had been passed in 2008.
When the authorities failed to take action, Yousuf filed a constitutional petition in the Sindh High Court seeking directions for demarcation and renewal of his lease.
The Court’s Ruling
The High Court dismissed the petition for one key reason: constitutional jurisdiction cannot be used to resolve disputed titles or factual controversies.
The judges explained:
1. Title under dispute → Since the petitioner’s ownership and lease renewal were already under challenge in a civil suit, the High Court could not bypass that forum. Questions of ownership and title must be decided in a civil court through evidence, not through a constitutional petition.
2. No proper demarcation application filed → Under Section 117 of the Sindh Land Revenue Act, 1967, and Rules 67-A & 67-B of the Sindh Land Revenue Rules, 1968, a landowner must apply to the Revenue Officer for demarcation. The petitioner's failure to file such an application made his constitutional plea legally incompetent.
3. Statutory safeguards ignored → The law requires full details of the land, parties, maps, and notices to ensure transparency in demarcation. Skipping these steps invalidates the entire process.
4. Civil proceedings take precedence → Since a civil suit was already pending with a status quo order, the High Court refused to intervene, holding that constitutional directions would prejudice the ongoing trial.
In short: The petition was dismissed as not maintainable.
Why This Ruling Matters
This judgment reinforces a fundamental principle in Pakistani property law:
If your title is disputed, go to a civil court. If you want demarcation, follow the proper procedure with the revenue authorities.
It prevents people from bypassing established legal forums and ensures that disputes requiring evidence are properly handled in trial courts.
For property owners in Karachi and Sindh, this ruling is a reminder to secure paperwork, follow statutory procedures, and avoid shortcuts.
Practical Insights for Property Owners
1. Demarcation must follow the law – Always file a proper application under Section 117, Sindh Land Revenue Act, with maps, records, and required fees. Without this, your claim will collapse.
2. Civil court is the right forum – If there’s a dispute over ownership or lease renewal, the High Court won’t help you in a writ petition. File a civil suit and prove your case with evidence.
3. Keep records safe – Maintain copies of allotment orders, mutation entries, and maps. Courts look for these documents first.
4. Don’t delay renewals – Apply for lease renewal well before expiry. Delay can create space for disputes and encroachments.
5. Use status quo orders wisely – If you already have a civil suit, ensure the interim order is enforced. The High Court won’t override it.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
1. Can I file a constitutional petition for land demarcation in Sindh?
Not directly. You must first apply to the Revenue Officer under Section 117 of the Sindh Land Revenue Act. If your title is in dispute, the civil court is the proper forum.
2. What if my land lease has expired?
You need to apply to the Board of Revenue for renewal. If denied or delayed, you may approach the civil courts for enforcement, but only after exhausting administrative remedies.
3. How do I protect my land from encroachers?
File a civil suit for injunction and possession. Additionally, apply for official demarcation to establish boundaries. Interim status quo orders can protect you until final decision.
4. Why did the Court refuse relief in this case?
Because the petitioner had not followed the statutory procedure for demarcation and because his title was already under challenge in civil court.
5. What’s the safest way to handle lease-to-ownership conversions?
Always ensure government notifications, lease orders, and mutation entries are properly recorded. Engage a property lawyer to file timely applications and defend against false claims.
Final Thoughts
The Sindh High Court’s ruling in Haji Muhammad Yousuf v. Province of Sindh (2025) underscores the importance of following the right legal forum and procedure in land matters. Property rights in Karachi and Sindh are only as strong as the documents and processes that back them.
If you are facing issues with land demarcation, lease renewals, or title disputes, consult a property lawyer early. Delays or shortcuts often lead to bigger problems—and as this case shows, the High Court won’t step in where civil courts and revenue authorities have jurisdiction.
Imagine this: you’re part of a housing society that has carefully planned community spaces—parks, mosques, and even a hospital site. These spaces aren’t just empty plots of land; they’re meant to shape the quality of life for every resident. But one morning, you discover that portions of this land have been taken over—illegally—by private individuals.
This isn’t just a hypothetical. It’s exactly what came before the Sindh High Court in Accountant General Sindh Employees Cooperative Housing Society v. Farman Raza and others (C.P No. D-866 of 2025).
The case raised a critical question: when land is encroached upon, can a housing society directly approach the High Court, or must it first go through statutory remedies like the Anti-Encroachment Tribunal?
Case Background
The petitioner, Accountant General Sindh Employees Cooperative Housing Society, has existed since 1971 and was allotted 20 acres in Karachi by the Government of Sindh back in 1973. Among its plots was Amenity Plot No. AM-2, measuring over 9,200 square yards.
This plot, under the approved master plan (2006), was earmarked for community facilities —a hospital, mosque, Imam Bargah, and park.
But in October 2023, private individuals (Respondents No.1–4) allegedly encroached on the plot with the help of land grabbers. Despite complaints to the police, SSP Anti-Encroachment, and other authorities, no action was taken.
The society argued that the encroachment deprived residents of public spaces and community facilities, causing “mental anguish and public inconvenience.” They turned to the High Court under constitutional jurisdiction (Article 199, Constitution of Pakistan) seeking:
A declaration that the land was reserved for public use,
Eviction of illegal occupants,
Directions for the police and anti-encroachment officials to act,
Protection from threats by the alleged land grabbers.
The Court’s Ruling
The Sindh High Court, however, dismissed the petition.
Here’s why:
1. Alternate Remedy Exists
The Court emphasized that under the Sindh Public Property (Removal of Encroachment) Act, 2010, the proper forum for such disputes is the Anti-Encroachment Tribunal.
Filing directly in the High Court bypasses this statutory scheme, which isn’t allowed.
2. Doctrine of Exhaustion of Remedies
The Court cited the Supreme Court ruling in Jameel Qadir v. Government of Balochistan (2023 SCMR 1919): writ jurisdiction cannot be used as the first resort. Litigants must exhaust remedies provided by law before invoking Article 199.
3. Disputed Questions of Fact
Whether the land was actually encroached upon, who was responsible, and the nature of occupation required factual inquiry, which is beyond the High Court’s writ jurisdiction.
4. Not Maintainable as Public Interest
Although the petitioner tried to frame the case as one of public interest, the Court viewed it as a localized encroachment dispute —not a matter for direct constitutional intervention.
Final Order:
The petition was dismissed as not maintainable, but the petitioner was given liberty to:
Approach the competent authority, and
If no action was taken, file proceedings before the Anti-Encroachment Tribunal.
Why This Case Matters
This judgment is a reminder for housing societies, landlords:
Direct writ petitions won’t work if a statutory remedy exists. Always first approach the authority or tribunal designated by law.
The Anti-Encroachment Tribunal is the right forum in Sindh for disputes involving occupation of public or amenity plots.
Courts will not resolve factual disputes under constitutional jurisdiction. Evidence and fact-finding must happen before the proper forum.
Residents and societies must carefully document encroachment, file complaints, and pursue remedies systematically before expecting relief from High Courts.
Practical Insights for Housing Societies
1. For Housing Societies
Always safeguard amenity plots; once encroached, eviction becomes lengthy and expensive.
Maintain updated records, maps, and allotment orders for use in tribunal proceedings.
2. For Tenants
Understand your tenant eviction rights in Pakistan —landlords must follow due process, but illegal occupation is treated differently.
Eviction due to misuse (e.g., using a restaurant plot as a political office) can also become grounds for termination.
3. For Landowners & Residents
Filing complaints with police is necessary but rarely sufficient. Escalate to the Anti-Encroachment Tribunal if no action is taken.
When in doubt, seek legal advice early to avoid delays that strengthen the illegal occupier’s position.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Q1: Can a housing society file a writ petition directly in High Court for eviction of illegal occupants?
A:No. The High Court requires societies to first pursue remedies before the Anti-Encroachment Tribunal under the 2010 Act.
Q2: What is the role of the Anti-Encroachment Tribunal in Pakistan?
A: It hears cases involving illegal occupation or construction on public, government, or amenity land. It has powers to order eviction, demolition, and prosecution.
Q3: Does this ruling affect tenant eviction cases in Pakistan?
A: Indirectly, yes. The principle is the same: if the law provides a forum (like Rent Controller for eviction cases), you must use that forum before approaching High Courts.
Q4: What if the competent authority fails to take action against encroachment?
A: Then the petitioner can file a case before the Tribunal. The Court has clarified that even private persons can move the Tribunal if authorities don’t act.
Q5: How can residents protect themselves from land grabbers?
A: By documenting encroachment early, filing timely complaints, involving society officials, and immediately pursuing remedies under the Sindh Public Property (Removal of Encroachment) Act, 2010.
Q6: Is tenant eviction different from encroachment?
A: Yes. Tenant eviction follows the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, through the Rent Controller. Encroachment involves illegal occupation without tenancy and is handled under the 2010 Act.
Closing Thought
The case of Accountant General Sindh Employees Cooperative Housing Society v. Farman Raza highlights a simple but powerful legal principle: courts will not allow shortcuts. Whether it’s tenant eviction or encroachment, the law has a roadmap, and you must follow it step by step.
For societies and residents, the lesson is clear: act quickly, document thoroughly, and pursue remedies at the right forum before expecting High Court relief.
Encroachment Laws in Pakistan | Key High Court Ruling
Learn how Pakistan’s High Court views tenant eviction and encroachment disputes. Case summary, ruling, and practical insights on eviction laws in Pakistan with FAQs.